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Marine Corps commanders have inadequate tools for energy awareness on the 
battlefield. The purpose of this study is to explore how vehicle telematics could impact 
operational reach through improving awareness of fuel stocks from hours to near-real 
time. The research uses an exploratory sequential mixed methods design to establish how 
current practices may change with the introduction of telematics. The first-phase 
qualitative findings suggest that the tactical fuel supply chain is inherently unstable due 
to information delays and information processing distortion. The second phase tests the 
hypothesis that telematics has a positive effect on operational reach. This is accomplished 
through a supply chain simulation that compares the current process against a 
reengineered solution with telematics. Between the two models, the reengineered supply 
chain produced the opportunity for higher tempo, more agile combat units, and increased 
system stability. While these are desirable effects, operational reach was reduced by 7% 
as fuel was more available to combat units. In addition to fuel-saving initiatives that 
telematics can inform, there may be long-term benefits that warrant the full integration of 
fuel telematics throughout the military supply chain. 
vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
1. Expeditionary Energy Strategy ....................................................1 
2. Expeditionary Energy Command and Control System ..............1 
3. Data Acquisition Technology Implementation ............................2 
B. PROBLEM .................................................................................................2 
1. Problem Statement.........................................................................2 
2. Purpose Statement .........................................................................2 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES .................................3 
D. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................4 
1. Mixed Methods ...............................................................................4 
2. Exploratory Sequential Design .....................................................4 
a. Qualitative Phase ................................................................4 
b. Quantitative Phase ..............................................................5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................7 
A. SYSTEMS THINKING .............................................................................7 
1. Systems Dynamics ..........................................................................7 
2. Optimization .................................................................................15 
3. Related Studies .............................................................................17 
a. Demand Side Management ...............................................17 
b. Supply-side Military Studies .............................................19 
c. Human Factors Studies ....................................................19 
B. MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE ..............................................................20 
1. Command and Control ................................................................20 
2. MAGTF Staff Structure ..............................................................24 
3. Concept of Employment for Artillery Units ..............................26 
III. METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................31 
A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................31 
1. Mixed Methods .............................................................................31 
2. Exploratory Sequential Design ...................................................31 
B. QUALITATIVE METHODS ..................................................................31 
1. Data Collection / Sources.............................................................31 
2. Data Analysis Approach ..............................................................34 
C. QUANTITATIVE METHODS ...............................................................34 
1. Data Collection / Sources.............................................................34 
viii 
2. Data Analysis Approach ..............................................................35 
IV. ANALYSIS ...........................................................................................................37 
A. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ..................................................................37 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................37 
2. AS-IS TACTICAL FUEL OPERATIONS ................................40 
a. The Information System ...................................................40 
b. Fuel Planning ...................................................................41 
c. Future Operations .............................................................43 
d. Current Operations ...........................................................44 
e. Fuel Demand Management ..............................................44 
f. Fuel Distribution Management ........................................47 
g. Bulk Fuel Command and Control ....................................48 
3. TO-BE TACTICAL FUEL OPERATIONS ..............................49 
a. Data Acquisition Technology ...........................................50 
b. Potential Benefits ..............................................................51 
c. Technology Risks ..............................................................52 
B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ...............................................................52 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................52 
2. Problem Articulation ...................................................................53 
3. Formulating a Dynamic Hypothesis ...........................................55 
4. Formulating a Simulation Model ...............................................56 
5. Testing ...........................................................................................59 
V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................65 
A. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ................................................................65 
1. Hypothesis Testing .......................................................................65 
2. Potential Impact on Operational Reach ....................................66 
B. LIMITATIONS ........................................................................................67 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................67 
1. Material and Non-Material Solutions ........................................67 
2. Focus Data Aggregation on Bottom-up Approach ...................68 
D. FUTURE STUDIES .................................................................................69 
1. Field Experiment to Measure Cognitive Loads to Assess 
Return on Knowledge ..................................................................69 
2. Field Experiment to Measure Information Distortion in 
Fuel Performance .........................................................................69 
3. User-based Collaborative Design of User Interfaces for 
E2C2S ............................................................................................69 
ix 
4. Case Study of Information System Maturity Model for 
Combat ..........................................................................................70 
E. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................70 
APPENDIX. A. SIMULATION DATA .........................................................................71 
APPENDIX B. SIMULATION MODEL DIAGRAM ..................................................75 
APPENDIX C. XMILE SIMULATION MODEL FORMULATION ........................77 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................81 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Beer Game Supply Chain Dynamics. Source: Sterman (2000). ................10 
Figure 2. Typical Beer Distribution Game Results. Source: Sterman (2000). ..........11 
Figure 3. Supply Chain with PID Controls. Source: Saheed (2009). ........................12 
Figure 4. First-Order Supply Chain System. Adapted from Abdel-Hamid 
(2016). ........................................................................................................14 
Figure 5. The LITNO Model. Source: Kress (2002). ................................................16 
Figure 6. The OODA Loop. Source: USMC (1996). ................................................21 
Figure 7. John Boyd’s OODA Loop. Source: Boyd (2010). .....................................21 
Figure 8. Feedback Loops in the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition. 
Source: Shattuck & Miller (2006)..............................................................22 
Figure 9. Regimental Staff Structure. Adapted from USMC (1996). .......................25 
Figure 10. Battalion Staff Structure. Adapted from USMC (1996). ...........................25 
Figure 11. Marine Expeditionary Brigade Task Organization. ...................................27 
Figure 12. Estimates of Daily Fuel Usage Rates. Source: USMC (2002). ..................28 
Figure 13. Fuel Requirement Estimation Formula. Source: USMC (2002). ...............28 
Figure 14. Consumption Rates and Capacities for Vehicles/Equipment. Source: 
USMC (2002).............................................................................................28 
Figure 15. Relationship between S-3 and S-4s within a MAGTF.  Source: 
Chiarotti (2007). .........................................................................................38 
Figure 16. MAGTF Deployment and Distribution Operations Center 
Organization. Source: USMC (2014). .......................................................39 
Figure 17. Demand Cycle Causal Loop Diagram. ......................................................41 
Figure 18. Hypothetical Information Delay by Hours. ...............................................45 
Figure 19. First Stage of Demand Reporting. .............................................................46 
Figure 20. Estimate versus Actual Error. Source: Chiarotti (2007). ...........................47 
Figure 21. Typical Fuel Distribution Mission Cycle. Source: Chiarotti (2007)..........49 
Figure 22. Overview of Expeditionary Energy Command and Control System. 
Source: Prato (2015). .................................................................................50 
Figure 23. Causal Loop Diagram, High-Order Goal Seeking Fuel Supply and 
Demand. .....................................................................................................54 
Figure 24. Second-Order Supply System with Distribution and Delay. Adapted 
from Sterman (2000). .................................................................................57 
xii 
Figure 25. As-Is Versus To-Be Stock Behavior. .........................................................59 
Figure 26. As-Is Versus To-Be MEB Stock Behavior. ...............................................60 
Figure 27. As-Is Versus To-Be stock Adjustments at Battalion and Battery-
Level. .........................................................................................................61 
Figure 28. As Is Versus To-Be Conveyor Stocks. ......................................................62 
Figure 29. Sensitivity of Battery Stock to Information Delay, As Is Model. ..............63 
Figure 30. As-Is and To-Be Simulation Design ..........................................................75 
xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Data Source, Item, and Contribution to Analysis. .....................................33 
Table 2. Relationship Between Information Delay & Inventory Coverage on 
Operational Reach. .....................................................................................55 
Table 3. Modeling Assumptions. .............................................................................56 
Table 4. Stock Data. .................................................................................................71 
Table 5. Flow Data ...................................................................................................72 
Table 6. Inventory Adjustment Data. .......................................................................73 
 
xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAEFS amphibious assault expeditionary fuel system 
AIM automated information module 
B1 platoon-level feedback loop 
B2 company/battery-level feedback loop 
B3 battalion-level feedback loop 
C2 command and control 
CAN controller area network 
CLC2S Common Logistics Command and Control System 
CLSA combat logistics support area 
COps current operations section 
COTS commercial off the shelf 
DSM demand-side management 
DOS day of supply 
E2C2S  Expeditionary Energy Command and Control System 
E2O Expeditionary Energy Office 
ERP enterprise resource planning 
ETL extract, load, transfer 
FARP forward arming and refueling point 
FMU field management unit 
FOps future operations section 
G-3 operations directorate, general’s staff 
G-4 logistics directorate, general’s staff 
GCSS Global Combat Service Support 
GDN Global Distribution Network 
HERS helicopter expeditionary refueling system 
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 
LCE logistics combat element 
LITNO logistics inter-temporal network optimization 
LSR logistics support request 
LSO logistics support order 
xvi 
LVSR logistics vehicle system replacement 
M970 semi-trailer refueler, 5,000 gallon 
MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
MDDOC MAGTF Deployment and Distribution Operations Center 
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit 
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
MPEM MAGTF Power and Energy Modeling software 
MTVR medium tactical vehicle replacement 
OODA observe, orient, decide, act 
PID proportional, integral, derivative 
S-3 operations directorate, regiment and below 
S-4 logistics directorate, regiment and below 
SME subject matter expert 
TAFDS tactical airfield fuel distribution system 
TFMS Total Force Management System 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USN United States Navy 
XML extensible markup language 




This study explores how delays in resource decision making and tactical supply 
chains relate to operational reach. Commercial sector success in the use of vehicle fleet 
telematics suggest that military application of these technologies may improve energy 
efficiency without sacrificing effectiveness (Henton & Noack, 2015; Robison, 2015). The 
Marine Corps wants to understand how changing the volume and frequency of resupply 
may increase operational reach (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2013). However, 
fuel distribution data is still a mystery, as the system is unable to track consumption, and 
human error reduces data quality (Skelding, 2014). The Marine Corps Expeditionary 
Energy Office manages the development of the Expeditionary Energy Command and 
Control System (E2C2S), which seeks to provide commanders with the ability to 
maximize operational reach (Daniel, 2015, p. 1). Understanding synergies gained from 
feedback loops in the system is important to maturing technology for effective use (J. 
Caley, personal communication, October 10, 2015). 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem is that dynamic demands create high stock requirements, which 
encumber supply and distribution capacity in the Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF). This is a problem because the operational reach of the task force is 
constrained to the flow of fuel from external sources. Resupply missions create 
vulnerability to asymmetric threats on ground lines of communication. Marines risk 
casualties and material losses as they attempt to mitigate energy-based risks to front line 
missions. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION/HYPOTHESIS 
With a lack of understanding of causal factors in fuel consumption, the 
exploratory phase of the study asked questions that would guide field observations and 
interviews. Qualitative in nature, the initial research question was open-ended. The sub-
questions were more direct to fill gaps in the emergent themes in with demand processing 
within the inductive, grounded approach. 
xviii 
How is energy performance data used in a tactical environment? 
 What are the hardware capabilities and limitations of sensors?
 What are the transmission capabilities and limitations of the control
system field management units?
 What manual, analog, and digital information processes are currently used
to meter and forecast fuel demand?
The findings of the first phase were the input for data collection in the second 
phase. The quantitative analysis assumed that telematics would eliminate or reduce 
delays and distortion in processing demand information throughout the supply chain. The 
qualitative findings suggested delays are a cause of inefficiency and reduced operational 
reach. As such, the hypothesis states a directional relationship between telematics and 
operational reach. The sub-questions are the dynamic hypotheses that are formed by 
assuming the interaction of inventory coverage and information delays predict settings 
where stocks will be depleted and disrupt continuous operations. This assumed that fuel 
stocks are a valid proxy for operational reach as they were observable and measurable. 
Data from fuel telematics has a positive effect on the operational reach. 
 High information delay and high inventory coverage has no impact on
operational reach.
 High information delay and low inventory coverage has a severe impact
on operational reach.
 Low information delay and high inventory coverage has no impact on
operational reach.




The mixed methods study employed an exploratory sequential design. The output 
of the qualitative first phase was the input for the quantitative second phase. The 
qualitative phase collected data from participant observations, interviews, and extant 
literature on energy performance studies. The analysis led to an As-Is/To-Be conceptual 
model of the tactical fuel supply chain. The To-Be model applied system dynamics 
principles to reengineer the demand information processing based on a hypothetical 
system that would acquire data via telematics, which would make this data available to 
various levels of the system in near-real time. Classic system dynamics supply chain 
models informed an experimental design for the quantitative phase (Sterman, 2000). 
D. ANALYSIS 
Findings from the first phase attributed delays and distortion of supply and 
demand for dysfunction in the system. The quantitative methods applied a system 
dynamics modeling software, Stella, to create an experiment that would simulate the As-
Is/To-Be supply chains in a controlled environment. The simulation captured the fuel 
stocks within a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that flowed to an artillery battery over a 
30-day period. 
Fully integrated telematics may provide total demand visibility, which is the 
ability of a supply chain activity to adjust supply line responses with near-real time data 
of retail consumption. Whereas supply trains currently distribute demands registered up 
to 48 hours before, telematics may allow distributions to reduce the delay by a factor of 
two at each level of the system. 
In the experimental design, an artillery battery plays the retail unit. The battery is 
consumed fuel at the assault rate, 9,600 gallons per day. The MEB provided fuel to the 
battalion, and the battalion provided fuel to the battery. Supply trains that delivered fuel 
24-hours after receiving orders connected the fuel stocks. On the fifth day of the 
simulation, the demand of the battery fell to and remained at the sustained rate, 9,000 
gallons. 
xx 
For the As-Is system, the change in demand threw the battery stock into 
oscillation indefinitely. The oscillations amplified by the same ratio in both systems. The 
difference is that the To-Be design is able to get ahead of dysfunction caused by the 
delays. When the change in demand occurs, each supply node changes its orders by the 
same fractional rate the orders changed at the retail level. The To-Be system absorbed the 
perturbation over a week and reached 95% equilibrium. Observations of the MEB 
inventory showed that operational reach between the two systems oscillated, but at 30 
days, the As-Is MEB stock was 7% greater than the To-Be system. The results did not 
support the hypothesis as formulated. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The E2C2S functionality will benefit from full integration of telematics in tactical 
vehicles. The current tactical supply chain operates resource decisions with bounded 
rationality, as it does not account for the delays that are latent in the system. The data on 
fuel performance engineered with a bottom-up approach with the measurements in 
gallons may limit the distortions caused by translations into days of supply or other 
abstractions when it is propagated forward in the system. 
Demand data acquired via telematics did not improve operational reach from an 
endurance perspective at the MEB-level. With fully integrated inventory adjustments 
from the platoon level at each resource decision point, the supply chain behaved with 
greater resilience. The increased availability of fuel at the platoon level created 
opportunities to lower inventory coverage and distribution maxima. This suggests that the 
logistics footprint was reducible while utilization rates of distribution assets were 
increasable. Optimizing these factors may lead to an increase in the operational reach of 
the unit from a time and space perspective. 
xxi 
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1. Expeditionary Energy Strategy 
The energy requirements of expeditionary units have been on a significant rise 
since the introduction of survivability and information technologies on the battlefield in 
the early 2000s (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2010). The energy requirements 
are primarily supported through converting liquid fuels via combustion engines. Fuel 
demands are forecasted using point estimates that are not controlled for operating or 
environmental conditions, which is perceived to have a dynamic effect on liquid fuel 
supply chains in a tactical environment. As a second-order effect of this phenomenon, the 
logistics footprint of expeditionary units has increased to accommodate the expanded fuel 
operations. 
In 2006, the Marines were directed to “commit to… the development of sensor 
and communication systems to enable operational commanders to manage fuel allocation 
and re-supply in real-time during combat operations” (United States Navy [USN], 2006, 
p. 3). The directive was a response to experiences commanders shared about fuel 
constrained operations and dysfunctional tactical supply chains (Chiarotti, 2007). The 
USMC (2010) expeditionary energy strategy intended “to change the way the Marine 
Corps employs energy resources to increase combat effectiveness and reduce our need for 
logistics support ashore” (p. 13). 
2. Expeditionary Energy Command and Control System 
The Expeditionary Energy Command and Control System (E2C2S) acquisition 
program was initiated in 2013 with a purpose to “integrate commercial and government 
energy measurement devices on equipment that consumes, distributes, produces, or stores 
fuel and/or power, and then feed performance information to commanders” (Daniel, 
2015, p. 1). At this stage of the program, the Expeditionary Energy Office (E2O) has 
sponsored several studies that contributed to the body of knowledge that suggest a 
positive relationship between commander’s access to energy performance data and their 
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respective unit’s operational reach in the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
(Daniel, 2015). Operational reach is defined as “a boundary of the campaign that is 
operationally feasible from the logistics point of view… measured in two dimensions: 
time and space” (Kress, 2002, p. 594). 
3. Data Acquisition Technology Implementation 
A human factors study found gaps in information processes and suggested 
interventions that may reduce inefficient energy practices (Salem & Gallenson, 2014). 
The E2O selected a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) wireless fuel metering technology 
to test its ability to perform data acquisition of fuel performance from vehicles in a 
tactical environment. The tests raised several questions about how the newly acquired 
technology may impact operational reach. 
B. PROBLEM 
1. Problem Statement 
Dynamic demands in ground fuel requirements result in high stock requirements 
for sustained tactical operations in the Marine Corps. The bulk fuel footprint encumbered 
the organic lift and storage capacity of the MAGTF operating in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
a point where external resupply continuously increased. This is a problem because the 
operational reach of the task force is constrained to the external resupply capacity. These 
resupply missions create a vulnerability to asymmetric threats on ground lines of 
communication between forward operating bases and their supply nodes. If the high 
dependency of sustainment via this mode of resupply is not addressed, the Marines will 
continue to risk casualties and material losses during resupply as they attempt to mitigate 
energy-based risks to front line missions. 
2. Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study is to explore fuel data acquisition technologies and test 
their impact on dynamic fuel demands through a time series analysis of tactical fuel 
supply chain simulations (Sterman, 2000; Savage, 2003, pp. 182, 305–307). The 
simulation focuses on a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and its fuel supply chain 
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down to the platoon level. This research contributes to the body of military science by 
bridging with the field of systems dynamics to provide insights on factors that drive 
operational reach and supply chain stability in a tactical environment. The results of this 
research may inform acquisition decisions and operating concepts of military 
organizations. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
With a lack of understanding of causal factors in fuel consumption, the 
exploratory phase of the study asked questions that would guide field observations and 
interviews. Qualitative in nature, the initial research question was open-ended. The sub-
questions were more direct to fill gaps in the emergent themes in with demand processing 
within the inductive, grounded approach. 
How is energy performance data used in a tactical environment? 
 What are the hardware capabilities and limitations of sensors? 
 What are the transmission capabilities and limitations of the control 
system field management units? 
 What manual, analog, and digital information processes are currently used 
to meter and forecast fuel demand? 
The findings of the first phase were the input for data collection in the second 
phase. The quantitative analysis assumed that telematics would eliminate or reduce 
delays and distortion in processing demand information throughout the supply chain. The 
qualitative findings suggested delays are a cause of inefficiency and reduced operational 
reach. As such, the hypothesis states a directional relationship between telematics and 
operational reach. The sub-questions are the dynamic hypotheses that are formed by 
assuming the interaction of inventory coverage and information delays predict settings 
where stocks will be depleted and disrupt continuous operations. This assumed that fuel 
stocks are a valid proxy for operational reach as they were observable and measurable. 
Data from fuel telematics has a positive effect on the operational reach. 
 High information delay and high inventory coverage has no impact on 
operational reach. 
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 High information delay and low inventory coverage has a severe impact 
on operational reach. 
 Low information delay and high inventory coverage has no impact on 
operational reach. 
 Low information delay and low inventory coverage has a moderate impact 
on operational reach. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Mixed Methods 
Mixed methods research designs combine and integrate qualitative and 
quantitative methods of research (Creswell, 2014). The approach uses a technique of 
triangulation of findings between the two methods as a means mitigating bias of a single 
approach. This study used an exploratory sequential design; the qualitative phase outputs 
were inputs to the quantitative portion. The outcome of the study provides “an 
understanding of participant views within the context of an experimental intervention” 
(Creswell, 2014, p. 231). 
2. Exploratory Sequential Design 
The exploratory sequential design separated the study into two phases. The 
qualitative phase collected data for analysis that built into the quantitative phase (Miles & 
Huberman, 2014). The experimental intervention examined in the participant observation 
used resource decision tools that introduced data created by fuel sensor devices through a 
prototype telematics data acquisition architecture. The quantitative phase of data collection 
and analysis was designed to test dynamic hypotheses predicting the impact of the 
telematics may have on the operational reach of Marine Corps units in a tactical 
environment. 
a. Qualitative Phase 
The qualitative phase of the study sought to answers to the research questions. 
The collection of data was mixed between a review of extant literature, participant 
observation, and semi-structured interviews of participants. Analysis used an inductive, 
grounded approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The findings were extrapolated to inform 
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modeling of current (As-Is) and possible future (To-Be) fuel supply chain that was the 
basis for data collection and analysis in the quantitative phase (Creswell, 2014). 
b. Quantitative Phase 
The quantitative phase was designed to test the hypotheses through modeling a 
case of supply chain management into an experimental design. The design was 
synthesized into a computer simulation. The experimental data was analyzed using time 
series analysis for stock behaviors and a sensitivity analysis to measure the impact of 
information delays on supply chain stability. The findings were used to inform the 
conclusions of the study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review uses a systems thinking view to discuss related bodies of 
knowledge that can inform the research question of how fuel telemetry may have a 
positive effect on operational reach through increased energy awareness. Systems 
thinking is a branch of science developed “to make the full patterns clearer, and to help 
us see how to change them effectively” (Senge, 2006, p. 216). Concepts that drive this 
study will come from fields of systems dynamics, mathematical optimization, theories of 
human cognition, and studies published by defense and academia focused on managing 
demand side energy requirements of operating motor vehicles. The review focuses on the 
design, structure, and behavior of systems and begins with a discussion of stocks, flows, 
and feedback loops. Next, operational research techniques for planning optimized fuel 
systems are reviewed with a focus on the inherent gap between assessed stocks, estimated 
stocks, and actual stocks. Then, a review of existing studies elucidates the need for an 
experimental design to explore how automating vehicle telematics may minimize the 
distortion between perception and reality of fuel performance. The chapter ends with a 
comparative review of Marine Corps doctrine and its connection to fundamental fields of 
information sciences: control and information theory. 
A. SYSTEMS THINKING 
1. Systems Dynamics 
Reductionist thinking approaches problems by deconstructing a problem down 
into the smallest components and deducing how changes in that component impact the 
overall system (Capra, 1996). Proponents of systems thinking argue that reductionist 
thinking can lead to an over-simplification of a system, which may lead to a limited 
understanding of the long-term effects of changing a system component on the system as 
a whole (Capra, 1996; Sterman, 2000; Senge, 2006; Meadows, 2008). The argument 
associates reductionists with a mechanistic worldview. Proponents question the utility of 
mechanistic and advocate for systems thinking worldviews (Capra, 1996, p. 27). Systems 
thinking approaches problems by viewing the world as interconnected systems, best 
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examined holistically instead of in isolated parts. However, the examiner of a problem 
must remain focused on solving the problem, not perfectly modeling the behavior of an 
entire system (Sterman, 2000, pp. 89–93). So, there must be a balance between being too 
simplified and too complex in order to produce conclusions and recommendations that 
are useful, accurate, and reliable (Sterman, 2000, 79). 
Systems dynamics takes on this challenge with a methodology that assumes a 
cyclic tendency that persists as a result of balancing flows of input and outputs of system 
processes. The relationships in a system are formed between causal links that make up 
the feedback loops within the system. The rate of change in causal links may differ 
throughout a system. Where there is a significant difference between an inflow and an 
outflow, a stock emerges. The behavior of stocks in a system reveals the resilience a 
system. Resilience is a systems ability to absorb perturbations that change flows 
connected to a stock, which is measured by observing the variation in the stock’s level 
over time (Sterman, 2000). 
The complexity of a system rests in the causal factors that effect the flow rates 
coming in and out of a process. Rates that possess more states characterize complex 
systems, and more variety is required in feedback mechnisms to regulate the complex 
system (Shannon, 1948; Ashby, 1956; Beers, 1984; Boyd, 1986). The structure of a 
complex system may include the combination of intermediate stocks that are governed by 
competing feedback loops, which creates non-linear behavior in systems (Capra, 1996; 
Sterman, 2000; Senge, 2006; Meadows, 2008). A technique for understanding complex 
systems involves observing stock behavior for trends that emerge over time. Systems 
dynamicists have used qualitative approaches to synthesize trends in behavior into 
categories or archetypes to faciliate diagnostics (Senge, 2006, pp. 6497–6653).  
One of many challenges in systems dynamics is to model the endogenous and 
exogenous causal factors in a way that reliably accounts for system behavior while 
accurately portraying the system structure (Sterman, 2000). If this is achieved, then the 
model can serve as an economic way to test how changes in parameters or structure can 
impact the performance of stocks over time. The efficacy of this kind of experimentation 
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is in challenging proposed interventions and discovering counterintuitive or 
counterproductive effects they may have beyond the immediate future.  
The field of systems dynamics offers several examples of system behaviors or 
trends that can inform the E2C2S system development. The focus of this research is how 
fuel telematics may impact the fuel supply chain in a tactical enviornment. The specific 
issues likely to influence system performance are unforeseen demand, unexpected 
shortfall in stocks, and an uncontrollable growth in consumption that all undermine the 
operational reach of commanders (Chiarotti 2007). A basic supply chain involves moving 
units of production, wholesale, distribution, and retail stocks. The stocks leave the system 
once the retail units flows to a consumer. A simple supply chain would have a uniform 
flow rate in one direction. The chain would be in equilibrium when inflows, outflows, 
and stocks remain constant over time. While this is not case in the tactical fuel system, 
the behavior is desirable as a system in equilibrium is predictable. When uncertainty is 
introduced, poor management decisions can lead to inefficient supply chains. 
The Beer Distribution Game provides a classic example of a supply chain made 
unstable my management decisions (Sterman, 2000, pp. 684–698). The game shows how 
feedback delays cause ocillations in supply chains and how human cognition has a 
tendency to focus only on the immediate state of stocks (Sterman, 2000, p. 694). This 
focus fails to account for the delays of orders and shipments further up the supply chain. 
The management decision effects resonate through the system and create unanticipated 
surpluses and backorders in response to a small change in demand from the consumer. 
Sterman (2000) accounts for the dynamics in the causal diagram (see Figure 1), which 




Figure 1.  Beer Game Supply Chain Dynamics. Source: Sterman (2000). 
The game was developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and has 
been performed by students and managers with fairly consistent results. The game is 
played in teams with a player occupying a node along the supply chain with the role of 
stock management for that node. The game is played in rounds where each player 
recieves stock, fills backlogs, recieves orders, and fills orders based on rules. Penalties 
are accrued for backlogs and surpluses with the goal of minizing a team’s collective 
penalties at the end of all rounds. To simulate the relationship with team members further 
up the chain, there is a shipping and order delay of two rounds between nodes.  
The game initates with the first few rounds of the system in equilibrium. Then, for 
a single round, customer orders increase by 100%. Since corrections take four rounds to 
impact a supply node, most managers make their next orders based on their current 
discrepancy without accounting for the corrections already in the system. The usual result 
is that the students order in a pattern that creates undershoot and overshoot that is 
amplified up the supply chain (see Figure 2). An important lesson is that poor results are 
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not a result of bad managers, but that management decisions are a product of the structure 
and incentives designed into the system (Sterman, 2000; Senge, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Typical Beer Distribution Game Results. Source: Sterman (2000). 
The game is a simplified version of how supply chains are organized in real life. 
However, it does capture how delayed orders can perpetuate an overresponse in supply.   
Assuming the objective of a supply chain is to meet an uncertain future demand while 
minimizing costs, demand forecasting seems like an attractive management tool. But, 
using this alone can be misleading as demand today does not guarentee the same demand 
tomorrow. The game illustrates how a small increase shocked the system out of 
equilibrium. Accordingly, supply forecast built off of demand alone decrease stock 
stability (Saeed, 2009). This is not desirable for tactical situations, as symptoms of 
system instability include long wait times, prolonged surges in supply operations, and 
other inefficencies (Sterman, 2000).  
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One way to achieve stability through the supply chain is to control the stock 
objectives, or desired amount of stocks on-hand. These buffers are known to increase 
inventory stability during operations (Meadows, 2008, p. 150). However, inventory 
buffers incur costs by increasing the stock management requirements to ensure the 
material is readily consumable. Resource decisions should take into account the flow 
constraints and stock objectives of proximate nodes in the supply chain. This can be 
enforced using proportional, integral, and derivative (PID) control processes that respond 
to changes in demand in a manner where the system may always be lagging behind the 
goal, but ocillations in inventory levels are reduced (Saeed, 2009). 
Saeed (2009) applied PID in a classical sense (see Figure 3); a feedback loop that 
proportionally adjusts production rates using the difference between current and desired 
inventory, plus the area or integral of the error over the period, plus the rate of change in 
the error (p. 64). The control output is the input production rate during the next period in 
the sytem. The key difference between PID and typical forecasts used in supply chain 
management, is that PID is tracking the instantaneous inventory while forecasts use 
historical demand (p. 74). So, a requirement for PID implementations is a direct link 
between the state of inventory and the production rate control. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Supply Chain with PID Controls. Source: Saheed (2009). 
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While wholesale and distributor levels of the tactical supply chain operate from 
fixed facilities, retailers have to maintain high-mobility balanced with capacity in a 
tactical environment. These management decisions are constrained physical limits, 
budgets, and policy. For instance, a 20-foot flatbed can accommodate two sixcon pods, 
which are modular rigs involved with distributing bulk fluids. A common dilemma in 
combat is to match the right pod combination to optimally support the mission. Pods can 
either carry 450 gallon containers or a 150 gallon-per-minute pump (Northrop Grumman, 
2010). Demand may exceed 450 gallons for a single distribution mission, but the decision 
needs to take into account the time allocated for transfering fuel in a combat 
environment. While 900 gallons seems better than 450, it may take significantly longer to 
process a queue of vehicles without the pump, so it becomes an optimization problem 
with an efficiency frontier that trades off between fuel and time. 
The capabilities and limitations of stocks and flows can be modeled in systems 
dynamics mathematically. Stella is a systems dynamics computer modeling application 
that uses a form of extensible markup language known as XML Interchange Language 
for Systems Dynamics (XMILE) (Isee Systems, 2016). Stella allows users to create icon-
based models that depict stock behavior over time in a system. Models with a single 
inventory and corresponding inflows and outflows are first-order systems (Sterman, 
2000, pp. 281–290). The top of the model represents the stock and flows, while the 
bottom variables represent less visible decision rules that govern the system (see Figure 
4) (Sterman, 2000, p. 669). 
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Figure 4.  First-Order Supply Chain System. Adapted from 
Abdel-Hamid (2016). 
Chapter IV introduces the mathematics that formulates each of the icons in the 
experimental design. The icons operate as input/outputs with information following the 
direction of arrows. The important concept to introduce is that the diagram infers a 
feedback loop that balances supply and demand. The dominant supply loop is controlled 
by two decision rules, which are variables that dictate inventory coverage and inventory 
adjustment times. The demand is controlled with one decision rule—shipments equal 
customer orders. 
The decision rules in the supply loop cause goal-seeking behavior to maintain the 
inventory at the inventory coverage level. The inventory coverage is a measure of time 
and the desired inventory is a measure of units; inventory coverage can be replaced with 
operational reach in terms of the E2C2S. The inventory adjustment is a response to the 
difference between the desired and actual inventory. The desired production is a forecast 
based on historical orders, but the response is dampened by the fractional inventory 
adjustment time.  
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The decision rule in the demand process proportionally reinforces the customer 
orders. As customers order more, their order activity increases shipments. Examples of 
alternative rules that would affect demand include rationing, cost scaling, or surplus 
objectives. Chapter IV explores the decision rules in the tactical supply chain. The 
quantitative analysis demonstrates how these decision rules impact system behaviors. 
The tactical supply chain can be viewed as a series of first-order systems similar 
to the Beer Distribution Game. The customer fuel status is represented by the vehicle fuel 
tank at the lowest level of the system, which can be aggregated to represent the respective 
unit level demand. There are multiple retailers as fuel is pumped from large bags and 
mobile tankers on the battlefield. The distributor role in the tactical fuel system would be 
the inventories kept at large fuel bladders that feed the retailers. The wholesalers would 
be the theater stocks that are held at major ports and the producers would be the facilities 
that actually refine the tactical fuel. Between each inventory would be a conveyors such 
as ships, pipelines, motor vehicles, or heavy-lift rotary aircraft (Northrop Grumman 2010; 
Hinkson, 2010).  
Stella can help researchers visualize the structure and organization of a system. The 
engine of the program uses mathematical formulations to enable quantitative analysis and 
evaluation of systems. The following section discusses some of the quantitative methods that 
are relevant to supply chain management. The analysis of data converges the Stella modeling 
tool with these methods to evaluate how the telematics may impact operational reach. 
2. Optimization 
Mathematical models can solve supply chains problems by modeling the flow of 
material throughout a network. One such model is the logistics inter-temporal network 
optimization (LITNO), which defines a logistics network into nodes, levels, edges, and 
periods (Kress, 2002, p. 2435). The model assumes that the number of nodes are be 
determined by the intensity of conflict. Nodes are points in a system where stocks are 
stored. The intensity also determines the number of levels, which are echelons in the 
system hierarchy. Nodes and levels are connected by edges, which are lines of 
communication. The edges relate to flows as they are defined by rates and capacity over 
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time. The temporal part of the model is based on the periods, or measures of time used to 
represent the length of the operation (see Figure5). 
 
 
Figure 5.  The LITNO Model. Source: Kress (2002). 
The optimization model solves a very specific type of computational problem. 
The model assumes deterministic values for amount of supplies, transportation capacity, 
consumption, and demand of the network over the specified time (Kress, 2002, p. 2474). 
The model simulates the interaction of supply and demand, which allows planners to 
estimate how a logistics network will perform when transportation or supply variables are 
adjusted. The objective of the model is to minimize the cost to satisfy demands (Kress, 
2002, p. 2483). The costs are the units, material, and transportation assets utilized in the 
model. 
The linear programming of the model allows operational planners to design 
networks that inform the organization of logistics forces, demand profiles, as well as the 
flow-rate of supplies into a theater of war (Kress, 2002, p. 2624). With demand profiles, 
time series analysis can be used to understand relationships between causal factors and 
their explanatory power on the system patterns (Savage, 2003). These demand profiles 
can be used to evaluate or synthesize goals for a system in the form of desired inventory 
levels or desired inventory adjustment times (Kress, 2002, p. 2624). 
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The LITNO’s limitations are in its deterministic nature and assumption that 
information is perfect throughout the system. The model also assumes that information 
and inventory flow in one direction and that waste just falls out of the system. A later 
discussion in the chapter will go into detail how this is sufficient when dealing with 
planning or detailed command and control, but insufficient for managing current 
operations or mission command and control. System dynamics models can utilize 
characteristics of linear programming while incorporating solver techniques such as the 
Monte Carlo simulations, triangular estimates, and feedback loops that can account for 
dynamic rates over time (Sterman, 2000, pp. 231–239; Savage, 2003). However, the 
solver techniques are only as reliable as the statistical inferences they are derived from; in 
other words, dynamic modeling has a garbage-in/garbage-out caveat. 
3. Related Studies 
The following discusses evidence of causal factors in fuel consumption found in 
related studies. Supply-side studies focus on response times and distribution methods 
(Hinkson, 2010; Northrop Grumman, 2010). Demand-side studies focus on how policies 
can impact consumption rates (Tulusan, Soi, Paefgen, Brogle, & Staake, 2011; Stillwater & 
Kurani 2012; Corbett, 2013; Kurani, Stillwater, & Jones, 2015). Other studies using 
grounded theory focused on the interaction of human behavior in the system and its effects 
on system performance (Salem & Gallenson, 2014; Salem, Gallenson & Aten, 2015). 
a. Demand Side Management 
The feedback loops that control consumption are discussed in terms of demand 
side management (DSM), which is defined as “the downstream activities associated with 
the consumption-end of the value chain, with the objective of understanding, influencing, 
and managing consumer demand” (Corbett, 2013, p. 749). The DSM strategy objectives 
fall into two categories: energy efficiency and load management (Corbett, 2013). For 
E2C2S, energy efficiency looks at how fuel is consumed, while load management looks 
at the how effectively demands and consumption are being matched. 
Based on this approach, the sensor density per capita and the collaborative efforts 
between consumer and energy providers are the greatest determinants of successful DSM 
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strategies (Corbett, 2013, p. 756). Corbett (2013) found that one-way automated meter 
readings from the point of consumption to the energy provider leads to processing waste 
and a significant negative impact on system performance (p. 756). Without 
communication and interaction with the consumer based on complementary goals, there 
is no evidence of increases in energy performance (Corbett, 2013, p. 756; Kurani, 
Stillwater, & Jones, 2015, p. 48). 
Many studies explore eco-driving, which can be defined as ecological or 
sustainable driving habits, which are focused on measuring the impact driving habits 
have on the environment (Tulusan, Soi, Paefgen, Brogle, & Staake, 2011; Stillwater & 
Kurani 2012; Kurani, Stillwater, & Jones, 2015). The primary measure of effectiveness 
for energy performance is miles per gallon. Other measures of performance include 
acceleration profiles, braking profiles, and fractional idle times. One study of interest 
sampled over three million vehicle trips across Europe and provided weights to factors on 
energy performance. Driver-related factors such as acceleration and braking profiles 
account for 10–30% variance in fuel consumption. The logistics of the trip accounted for 
a 50–70% variance in fuel consumption. Most interesting was that temperature and wind 
speed accounted for up to 100% variation in fuel consumption during trips (CGI Group 
Inc, 2014). This meant an engine that operated at 13–17 miles per gallon, four miles per 
gallon of variance, could be expected to operate at 9–17 miles per gallon during a storm. 
The conclusion seems rational as braking and accelerating behavior may become more 
aggressive with limited visibility.  
There are opportunities to identify and reduce waste through excessive idling of 
tactical vehicles (Skelding, 2014, p. 24). Overall, the eco-driving studies do not 
generalize well to the E2C2S objectives. The reason for this is that combat related 
missions require aggressive driving profiles. The missions require an immediate response 
to hostile threats and austere conditions in low-visibility or low-light conditions. These 
driving profiles demand aggressive acceleration and braking to control formations in a 
manner that favors security and survivability over fuel efficiency. While the solutions 
proposed in the study may not fit well in a combat role, the development of goals for 
energy providers and consumers on the battlefield should focus on increased awareness 
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of fuel consumption, resupply response times, and maximizing the utilization of fuel 
distribution assets (Skelding, 2014, p. 24).  
b. Supply-side Military Studies 
There are three particular Marine Corps-focused studies that explore fuel 
monitoring and expeditionary fuel operations (Chiarotti, 2007; Northrop Grumman, 
2010; Hinkson, 2010). Chiarotti’s (2007) study provided an initial assessment of how 
planning and supply-side management of fuel may be impacted by automated sensor 
reporting. The study identified key benefits of capturing historical mission-based demand 
profiles to improve the accuracy of fuel requirements. In addition, near real-time 
information may reduce response times through early detection of critically low stocks 
(Chiarotti, 2007, p. 56). Northrop Grumman’s (2010) study provided an in depth analysis 
of endogenous factors including fuel equipment specifications and methods to integrate 
these constraints into a LITNO model over a series of brigade and corps-level scenarios. 
Hinkson’s (2010) contribution identified the benefits of adopting a standard metric to 
model multi-class distribution systems requirements; he represented all supply and 
demand in terms of pounds, which then allowed load matching with distribution assets. 
His study found the greatest factor of a unit’s sustainability was in the response time to 
supply demands (p. 58). 
c. Human Factors Studies 
Additionally, there are several recent studies that discuss the feasibility of 
improving energy performance through a portfolio of initiatives that address human 
factors that impact both supply and demand side dynamics (Salem & Gallenson, 2014; 
Henton & Noack, 2015; Robison, 2015; Salem, Gallenson, & Aten, 2015). Salem & 
Gallenson (2014) highlighted the lack of energy awareness and how fuel tracking is ad-
hoc and prone to error (p. 30–32). While fuel telematics may mitigate these issues, 
success is dependent on how the data requirements are formed, integrated, analyzed, and 
acted on (Henton & Noack, 2015; Robison, 2015). The human factors studies suggest an 
approach to the acquisition and life cycle management of vehicle telematics that are 
designed for deep situational awareness (Salem, Gallenson, Aten, 2015, p. 16). 
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B. MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE 
1. Command and Control 
United States Marine Corps operations subscribe to a simplified version of 
Boyd’s (1986, 2010) naturalistic decision-making theory (USMC, 1996, pp. 63–65). 
Boyd’s (2010) framework categorized decision making into a four interrelated activities; 
observation, orientation, decision, and action (OODA) (p. 3). The principal premise 
reduced from the theory is that “in any conflict, the antagonist who can consistently and 
effectively cycle through the OODA loop faster—who can maintain a higher tempo of 
actions—gains an ever-increasing advantage with each cycle” (USMC, 1996, p. 65). The 
second premise is that “multiple OODA loops spin simultaneously, although not as the 
same speed, as commanders exercise command and control at their own level and locale” 
(USMC, 1996, p. 64). The USMC (1996) evaluated operational control of a mission by 
assessing the tempo relative to the protagonist of their actions (p. 65). 
The USMC’s (1996) identification with Boyd’s (2010) framework is relatable to 
system dynamics terminology. Boyd’s (2010) framework views decision making as a 
functional process related to many interconnected feedback loops. In terms of systems 
dynamics, tempo is a rate of change or flow. Each activity accumulates information that 
is processed that impacts future iterations. The USMC (1996) process simplifies the 
interconnectedness into a linear cycle (see Figure 6). Boyd’s process suggests a more 




Figure 6.  The OODA Loop. Source: USMC (1996). 
 
 
Figure 7.  John Boyd’s OODA Loop. Source: Boyd (2010). 
The USMC (1996) version of the model is a linear cycle where the 
interdependences of an activity treat the output of a previous step as an input. There is a 
mechanistic bias in this view, so it may be useful for some problems, but is limited when 
trying to understand causal factors in the behavior of a control system. Boyd’s (2010) 
model included five interrelated endogenous factors and three exogenous factors, with 
several feedback loops that suggested nonlinear dynamics. Certain activities will 
dominate based on the state of the environment and that dominance may shift to other 
activities as the environment changes. 
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The following section of the USMC (1996) doctrine discussed the information 
processing hierarchy as the engine to the decision activity in the OODA loop (pp. 67–71). 
There is an emphasis on using overview pictures based on image theory, which is the 
theory that “people generally think in terms of ideas or images— mental pictures of a 
given situation” (USMC, 1996, pp. 77–78). The discussion suggested that analysis and 
synthesis processes embedded in the first O of the OODA loop are done with different 
lenses, and this idea was well defined by Shattuck and Miller’s (2006) dynamic model of 
situated cognition (see Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8.  Feedback Loops in the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition. 
Source: Shattuck & Miller (2006). 
The USMC (1996) understanding of image theory states that information 
experiences “a certain degree of distortion and delay,” as it passes through processing 
lenses to the decision maker (p. 75). An insight pulled from this concept is that certain 
decisions have a higher requirement for accuracy and certainty, which agrees with the 
observation that information has varying processing paths to the commander (USMC, 
1996; Shattuck & Miller, 2006). Shattuck and Miller (2006) address the issue of 
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distortion at the sensor level being due to insufficient numbers, malfunctions, lack of 
sensitivity, and a lack of specificity (p. 7). 
Marine Corps’ doctrine on C2 attempts to mitigate these information delay and 
distortion issues with decentralized control, which is related to the field of cybernetics. 
The USMC (1996) described the context of mission command and control as having 
increased uncertainty or entropy in the decision cycle’s environment (p. 79). The idea 
that “discipline imposed from above is reinforced with self-discipline throughout the 
organization,” which grants higher autonomy or decentralized decision making authority 
is strikingly similar to the concept of optimal decentralization as discussed in the Viable 
System Model (USMC, 1996, p. 79; Beers, 1985, p. 16). Optimal decentralization is 
matching the complexity of the environment with the complexity of decisions that can be 
made at that level of the system—the match measures a variety of sensory states and 
response states in the actor (Beers, 1985, p. 10). Interestingly, the concept of variety as it 
relates to sensors is identical to Boyd’s (1987) use of adaptability in a command and 
control systems, which stated that “without variety and rapidity, one can neither be 
unpredictable nor cope with the changing and unforeseen circumstances” (p. 4). The idea 
of requisite variety is based on Ashby’s (1956) explanation as it related to feedback loops 
(Beers, 1985, p. 10). 
The USMC’s E2C2S development addresses sensors that report fuel performance 
at the platform level. The platforms of interest for this investigation are the motor 
vehicles. The current sensors are human-machine interfaces that include visual reading of 
fuel gauges and manual extrapolation of fuel tank stocks (Aten & Gallenson, 2014; 
McCombs, 2015). These sensors are creating data that is then processed to inform 
resource decisions commanders make for during operations. 
In terms of systems dynamics, the sensor variety can be represented with the use 
of Boolean logic controllers that factor into flow rates. Best solutions to improve energy 
awareness on the battlefield will require an analysis of the problem from the perspective 
mission Command and Control (C2), as detailed C2 assumes only two rates in 
consumption (assault and sustained) and assumes distribution perfectly meets demand 
instantaneously (Kress, 2002). 
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The appropriate approach depends on the observer’s point of view in relation to 
the environment. Kress’s (2002) observations were focused on theater-level planning and 
the E2C2S is focused on tactical-level. This dichotomy is a reflection of nested OODA 
loops. The USMC (1996) defined this as the “spectrum of command and control in which 
mission command assumes a probabilistic/unpredictable” nature versus the deterministic/ 
predictable nature that is suited for detailed command and control (p. 81). For the purpose 
of this investigation, energy awareness will be viewed from the points of view of an 
artillery platoon, battery, and battalion commander in battle. 
2. MAGTF Staff Structure 
The USMC’s (1996) document splits command and control into a typology of 
mission and detailed. The split suggests that problem solving used in planning would be 
different from the method used in execution. The MAGTF views execution in terms of an 
operations cycle. The operations cycle occurs within the execution of a plan. There is a lack 
of literature on how the MAGTF staff and subordinate elements parse this work; however, 
one gains insight by recognizing that a subordinate headquarters is structured to replicate the 
functions of its parent headquarters. Hierarchical systems that are composed of identical 
structures at different scales are known as fractals (Beers, 1984; Capra, 1996, p. 137–142). 
For information systems, the benefits of fractal organization include process stability and 
reduced information requirements throughout the system (Meadows, 2008, p. 83). 
All MAGTF staffs have functionally aligned structures. On a general’s staff, the 
Operations directorate (G-3), as the name suggests, directs the unit operations. Scale can 
be measured by the rank of an office. Every general officer’s staff has a G-3 directorate, 
which is led by a colonel. This holds true at the MAGTF-level until you get down to a 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which is commanded by a colonel, in which case the 
operations section (S-3) is led by a lieutenant colonel. Battalions have a major who runs 
the S-3, and at the company or battery level, the duty is delegated from the commander to 
an enlisted operations chief. Some platoons assign an operations sergeant, but the staff at 
level may be a singular person, which is important to note as a structural boundary. The 
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decision cycles at the platoon level are as rapid as the cognitive load is so low that they 
are in a perpetual state of executing current operations. 
There are three temporally driven subsections at the battalion level and higher 
(see Figures 9 and 10). Plans, Future Operations (FOps), and Current Operations (COps) 
are subsections that have different foci when it comes to disseminating commands and 
implementing controls. While there is no formal doctrine that delineates these separate 
sections, it has been programmed into the staff structure in the Marine Corps Total Force 
Management System (TFMS). The logic separates problem-solving efforts based on the 
information requirements on hand. These sections are tightly bound to ensure continuity, 
but they are also tied to other functions, as they are the central control in any unit. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Regimental Staff Structure. Adapted from USMC (1996). 
 
 
Figure 10.  Battalion Staff Structure. Adapted from USMC (1996). 
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The role of Plans is to create the general concept for how a unit will accomplish a 
mission. FOps’ role is to disseminate orders, direct resource allocation, and synchronize 
subordinates with support elements. COps’ role is to provide real-time control of units in 
the battlespace, assess progress, maintain situational awareness, and operate decision 
support platforms. The utility of the self-replicating design above the battalion is in 
information processing and controls—standardization of staff functions and alignment 
creates natural input and output points for feedback loops that must traverse through 
different staff levels. As a decision maker, one can logically anticipate where to get 
informed, as information management is designed into the organizational structure. 
3. Concept of Employment for Artillery Units 
The portfolio of doctrine for the training and employment of field units is 
pertinent to this investigation. Artillery units are typically motorized with the prime 
movement platform being the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR), also 
known as the 7-ton. The USMC assigns a single artillery regiment to each infantry 
division. Typical task organization assigns an artillery battalion to support an infantry 
regiment and an artillery battery (equivalent to a company-level command) is assigned to 
support infantry battalions.  
A battery task organization (see Figure 11) typically consists of three platoons—
headquarters and two firing platoons. The platoons are divided into two to four shooting 
sections with three cannons per section. The main artillery cannon is the 155mm M777 
Howitzer. These cannons are matched with two MTVRs, a prime mover and a support 
vehicle. The vehicles carry the troops who operate the cannons as well as the complement 




































Figure 11.  Marine Expeditionary Brigade Task Organization. 
The concept of employment typically depends on the variety of firing solutions 
required by the directing fire support agency. It is typical for platoons to operate with a 
degree of autonomy. A typical scheme of maneuver will use artillery in the rear area to 
generate fires to enable maneuver at the forward echelon of the battle area. Before the 
battle moves forward where maneuver support exceeds the range of effective artillery 
support, ~35 kilometers, artillery units will echelon gun sections to new firing positions 
(USMC, 2002 p. 58). 
Fuel support is generally coordinated between the battalion logistics section and 
the battery gunnery sergeant. Planning data is typically drawn from doctrine (see Figures 




Figure 12.  Estimates of Daily Fuel Usage Rates. Source: USMC (2002). 
 
 
Figure 13.  Fuel Requirement Estimation Formula. Source: USMC (2002). 
 
 
Figure 14.  Consumption Rates and Capacities for Vehicles/Equipment. 
Source: USMC (2002). 
The data is formulated in to clear and simple point estimates to facilitate the ease 
of use in planning. The MTVR fuel consumption rates are listed as unknown, even 
though it’s the equipment used to haul the field artillery cannons. A principle of fuel 
resupply that addresses the uncertainty is to refuel at every opportunity (USMC, 2002, p. 
130). While the protocol simplifies things for the drivers, it results in a lack of awareness 
of consumption rates within the chain of command. While there is some discussion of the 
logistics section responsibilities, information requirements from the battery are not 
addressed, and it is assumed that these are ad-hoc and dependent on personalities and 
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experiences in the unit. The takeaway is that there is a different treatment at the 
theoretical level of mission command and control and actual mission execution. The gap 
may explain why there is a systematic distortion and error in fuel sensing and response. 
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1. Mixed Methods 
Mixed methods research designs combine and integrate qualitative and 
quantitative methods of research (Creswell, 2014). The approach uses a technique of 
triangulation of findings between the two methods as a means mitigating bias of a single 
approach. This study used an exploratory sequential design; the qualitative phase outputs 
were inputs to the quantitative portion. The outcome of the study provides “an 
understanding of participant views within the context of an experimental intervention” 
(Creswell, 2014, p. 231). 
2. Exploratory Sequential Design 
The exploratory sequential design separated the study into two phases. The 
qualitative phase collected data for analysis that built into the quantitative phase (Miles & 
Huberman, 2014). The participant observation examined resource decisions tools that 
introduced data created by fuel sensor devices through a prototype telematics data-
acquisition architecture. The quantitative phase data collection and analysis were 
designed to test dynamic hypotheses predicting the impact of the telematics may have on 
the operational reach of Marine Corps units in a tactical environment. 
B. QUALITATIVE METHODS 
1. Data Collection / Sources 
The data collection process began with solicitation of participants who were 
separated into two categories: subject matter experts (SMEs) on the telematics and 
Marines involved with monitoring and managing fuel resources. Two SMEs and one 
Marine consented to participate in the study. A site visit was conducted at a location 
where Marines and SMEs were training and prototyping various technologies aimed at 
improving expeditionary energy performance. 
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The Marine participant was a company grade officer (lieutenant to captain) 
directly involved with managing fuel operations in a tactical environment. The subject 
participated in a structured interview, during a three-day site visit, which was designed to 
extract knowledge of processes that are normally made in fuel resource decisions in a 
tactical environment. The interview was conducted in a single fifteen-minute session and 
was recorded and transcribed by the researcher. 
The SMEs were stationed out of the same base as the Marines observed in the 
study. One SME was a warrant officer and the other was a civilian government employee 
involved in the implementation and evaluation of a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) fuel 
telematics devices. The SMEs served as liaisons for the site visit and were consulted for 
comments on data interpretation. 
Both the researcher and SMEs initiated follow-up emails. Email correspondence 
occurred over a six-month period. Initial communication concerned logistics and 
collaborating on subject recruitment for the site visit. During and following the site visit, 
SMEs provided numerous digital and hard-copy documents. The documents ranged in 
topic content from previous analysis of fuel operations, engineering and design of 
telematics architecture, to detailed schedules for the development and testing of 
technology. 
The researcher conducted participant observation during a three-day site visit. 
Observations were recorded via mixed media, which included seven pages of paper field 
notes and sketches, an audio recording of the Marine interview, a digital page of notes on 
Microsoft OneNote, and photographs of telematics devices and fuel logs observed at the 
field training sites (see Table 1). 
The exploratory phase continued after the site visit with a collection of extant 
literature including previous studies of fuel consumption, studies of dynamics of supply 
chains, archetypes of complex systems, and open-source policy and guidance published 




Table 1.   Data Source, Item, and Contribution to Analysis. 
Data Source Item Contribution 
Field Notes  Platform Mission based fuel 
profile sketch  
Departure point for building 
consumption parameters  
Field Notes  Data attributes from AIM/BUS  Data engineering concept of key 
values used to join database 
tables on fuel performance and 
vehicle mission tasks  
Field Notes  Causal diagram  First prototype of causal 
diagram to design fuel model  
Field Notes  Stock and Flow  First proto of stock and flow of 
amphib MEB/ESG fuel source 
and sinks  
Field Notes  Network diagram of BUS to 
data warehouse  
Network interfaces at layers 1 - 
3 (TCP/IP) stack  
SME UEM AAR Report  Provides account of process 
engineering issues with fuel 
accounting procedures - 
provides current process  
SME  LAWST info sheet  Model for tracking fuel and 
distributions  
SME  ScanGauge artifacts  Gave an overview of how it 
added a tool to the vehicle user 
interface to visualize and track 
fuel performance data based on 
costs - offered that it was 
received with a low opinion and 
adoption rate  
SME MPEM info sheet  Turns out its more focused on 
grid planning and optimization  
Participant  Exercise Marine Interview  Account of field processes for 
fuel performance and 
accounting  
SME  Energy C2 POA&M  Design of experiment, structure, 
and concept of employment  
SME Vehicle report  Shows how data gets compared 
from CAN bus samples; 102 
entries  
SME NAVSEA ITX 3–15 Report  Shows how analysis generates 
fuel performance of unit by 
vehicle type.  
SME CAN BUS extract sample  Provides txt file that appears tab 
delimited that shows the syntax 
of the data pulled off of the 




2. Data Analysis Approach 
The initial analysis of the qualitative data involved diagram mapping. The data 
collected was reviewed over multiple iterations to map processes (Miles & Huberman, 
2014). Diagram mapping was used to visualize stages of processes for the As-Is process 
(Meyer, 1991). Subsequent analysis joined these diagrams with literature to derive 
meaning. 
Meaning was drawn from the data and process maps using an inductive, grounded 
approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The researcher reviewed interview transcripts and 
extant literature, iterating between the two to identify themes and patterns related to fuel 
and energy performance. Categories suggested by extant literature included demand side 
management and supply side management functions in which processes interacted. The 
As-Is case was compared to optimized supply chain cases and identified subcategories of 
decision variables such as inventory coverage times, expected and actual delays, expected 
and actual order rates, inventory adjustment times, and forecasting. 
The qualitative phase findings were extrapolated into an As-Is model of fuel 
supply management. This was the input for the quantitative phase, which informed the 
experimental design, dynamic hypotheses, and measures for collection and analysis 
(Creswell, 2014). 
C. QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
1. Data Collection / Sources 
Findings from the exploratory phase of the research were used as the initial data 
samples for the quantitative collection (Creswell, 2014). Modeling cases were sampled 
and based on similar categories and subcategory properties; a system dynamics supply 
chain model was selected as a baseline (Sterman, 2000). Extant literature on the 
capabilities and characteristics of fuel systems in the Marine Corps were used determine 
the subject for the experimental design (Northrop Grumman, 2010). 
Data was pulled from the Marine Air Ground Task Force Power and Energy 
Modeling (MPEM) software to develop accurate order rates for the subject in the 
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experimental design (GroupW, 2015). Studies on Marine Corps fuel consumption were 
reviewed to triangulate this data for validity (Chiarotti, 2007; Northrop Grumman, 2010).  
2. Data Analysis Approach 
The hypothesis is that telematics increases operational reach. Independent 
variables include information delay and level of data integration; the dependent variable 
being the MAGTF’s days of supply. The independent variables interact to form dynamic 
hypothesis. The Sterman (2000) calls for testing all combinations. This was done with the 
understanding the hypothesis implies more confidence of the causal effects identified by 
the researcher. This is different from the hypothesis “telematics affect operational reach,” 
which would suggest less certainty as its non-directional about the positive/negative 
relationship between the independent and dependent variable. 
The data analysis approach for this study replicates the systems dynamics case 
study of supply chain dynamics in the Beer Distribution Game (Sterman, 2000; Senge, 
2006). The problem articulated for the study was used to inform dynamic hypotheses that 
would test the potential impact of fuel telematics on the fuel distribution system 
(Sterman, 2000). A simulation model was formulated of the As-Is and To-Be systems 
relying on the data and findings from the qualitative phase of the study. 
The two models were tested for validity by eliminating extraneous variables. 
Also, the model variables were set to extreme circumstances to test for reliability. The 
decision variables were evaluated for ability to realistically represent data that would be 
used by managers in a tactical environment. 
After model validity was addressed, the dynamic hypotheses were tested. The 
independent variables were adjusted and the dependent variables were measured. 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on the relationship between variables. These were 
contextualized against the quantitative performance of the supply system. 
The findings of the quantitative phase of the study were used to evaluate policy 
design for the implementation of fuel telematics in tactical vehicles. Based on the 
performance in the model and lessons from extant literature, conclusions were drawn 
about the outcomes of the tests. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
According to the Expeditionary Energy Office, the purpose of the Expeditionary 
Energy Command and Control System (E2C2S) is to control the supply and demand of 
energy with an objective to maximize the operational reach of the MAGTF (Daniels, 
2015). Vehicle telematics are being explored within that purpose. The supply-side 
process can be represented as the flow of liquid petroleum from wholesale sources to 
vehicles. The demand-side process deals with processing transactional orders that close 
when fuel is delivered. This chapter describes the As-Is demand transaction life cycle, 
which will illuminate information delays and distortions that are targets of the fuel 
telematics interventions which will be enumerated further in the To-Be Process.  
To build off of Chapter II’s introduction to the G/S-3 functions, the logistics (G/S-
4) staff functions are key in transitioning demand from the customer to the retail-level 
supply commodity. The internal actions that a field unit performs to sustain operations 
are considered logistics operations. The G/S-4 section of a unit manages parallel 
operations that are integrated with the G/S-3 through synchronization processes that are 
both formal and informal (see Figure 15). One of the activities that synchronizes 
operations with logistics is distribution management. 
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Figure 15.  Relationship between S-3 and S-4s within a MAGTF.  
Source: Chiarotti (2007).  
Distribution is a function that integrates supply operations with transportation 
assets. The wholesale and distribution of fuel are performed in a MEB by the Logistics 
Combat Element (LCE). Distribution management is executed in an activity that is 
organized under the G-3 and staffed by G-4 personnel (see Figure 16). The LCE is the 
main provider of maintenance, supply, engineering, transportation, medical, and services 
to the MAGTF. While all battalion S-4s manage the internal logistics requirements that 
correspond to these functions, the LCE S-3 directs activities that fulfill those 




Figure 16.  MAGTF Deployment and Distribution Operations Center 
Organization. Source: USMC (2014). 
The As-Is process is generalized as a fuel supply chain based on system dynamics 
modeling that captures fuel inventory from the vehicle platform up to the battalion 
logistics section. This model shows the dynamic interactions of fuel distribution with 
information delays that communicate demands through the various levels of stock in the 
MAGTF. The theoretical time delays and other information processing factors are based 
on data collected from observations and documented accounts of MAGTF operations. 
Scientific studies on fuel consumption factors provided evidence for aspects of the model 
that did not exist or lacked scientific validity in military accounts of the process. 
Since 2007, the Marines have been developing a To-Be process to better control 
energy on the battlefield. The objective of increased energy awareness has prompted an 
examination of a range of technology-based solutions. The benefits and limitations of 
these technologies are described in terms of potential impacts on the As-Is process. The 
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result informed a model that used system dynamics to demonstrate the potential impact of 
fuel telematics on the supply and demand of fuel for tactical vehicles. 
The model is used as an input to the subsequent chapter’s experimental design 
that measured and compared the As-Is and To-Be processes. This was done in terms of 
stock behavior as it relates to internal and external factors that regulate the performance 
of each respective system. This chapter establishes evidence for the experimental designs 
with a foundation in concepts of communication, cybernetics, and systems thinking 
introduced in the previous chapter. 
2. AS-IS TACTICAL FUEL OPERATIONS 
a. The Information System 
The As-Is tactical fuel operations are controlled by an ad hoc information system 
which includes the people, processes, hardware, sensors, and data that manage fuel 
resources on the battlefield. To gain a better understanding of energy awareness and 
consumption, the following discusses major consumption factors and how those factors 
are related to one another within the system. This establishes what causal effects have the 
greatest impact on vehicle fuel performance in the context of this study. How the system 
processes the information about fuel will be connected to the overall operational reach of 
the MAGTF. 
Within this system, one can relate environmental factors to engine loads, engine 
loads to fuel consumption and conflict intensity, and fuel consumption to a feedback loop 
that balances fuel demand with fuel distribution (see Figure 17). Information 
requirements for the system are created in the planning phase. The information 
processing requirements are a part of the fuel demand management. The fuel demands 
create fuel distribution missions that lead to issue and receipt of fuel. The objective of the 
tactical fuel operations is to minimize fuel demands through distributions. This 
optimization is qualitatively based on the system’s ability to perform within flow, 
capacity, and response-time constraints at various nodes in the system. The overall 
system can be seen as a series of second-order nonlinear supply chain that balance 
distributions of fuel with the demand of fuel. 
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Figure 17.  Demand Cycle Causal Loop Diagram. 
There is usually a proportional relationship between a consumption rate and 
inventory being consumed. For example, when a fuel tank close to empty, a driver will 
avoid excessive braking or acceleration to conserve what is left. However, when you 
aggregate a platoon of vehicles, the platoon commander may not have an accurate sense 
of the platoon’s inventory and may assign tasks that are not conservative when stocks are 
low. The knowledge also allows a manager to assign an urgency of need or required 
delivery time for resupply, but a challenge that emerges in the current system is that 
suppliers and consumers of fuel are not tightly coupled when it comes to sharing 
information (Chiarotti, 2007; Reeves, 2014). Information flows one way in the system; 
consumption turns into demand, which turns into distributions and these reduce demands. 
Ideally, delays or a lack of distributions would be linked to consumption, a self-
regulating system would avoid running out of fuel. However, there have been 
observations of units operating without energy awareness and exhausting fuel stocks 
without prior realization. 
b. Fuel Planning 
There are two types of plans in the Marine Corps: deliberate and rapid response. 
Deliberate plans have longer time horizons that may begin refining fuel estimates months 


















with a finite set of predefined support packages. Rapid response plans are template 
responses to emergent contingencies and are executed in a matter of hours after notice. 
Deliberate plans are suited for brigade-level operations since these organizations are 
designed to handle high intensity conflicts that last up to 30 days without external 
resupply. 
While units at all levels participate in deliberate planning, a campaign’s plan is 
issued by field units at the regimental level or higher. Deliberate plans include concepts 
of support and annexes that account for the sustainment of fuel throughout the operation. 
Based on the operational design within the plan, fuel requirements are estimated based on 
the unit type, equipment, and intensity of the conflict day-by-day. For an artillery 
battalion consisting of three line batteries and one headquarters battery, fuel consumed 
daily would be 3,341 gallons for the assault rate and 1,954 gallons of fuel for the 
sustained rate in 2007 (Chiarotti, 2007, 67). However, those estimates increased to 
16,749 gallons for the same unit’s assault rate and 15,927 gallons for the sustained rate in 
a modeled scenario (Northrop Grumman Information Systems, 2010, p. 319). The most 
recent planning tool estimated a daily 9,616 gallons in the assault and 9,061 gallons at the 
sustained rate (GroupW, personal communication, April 22, 2016). 
In planning, fuel consumption rates are based on an average rate of gallons per 
hour per piece of equipment assigned to the unit. An assault rate is defined as 12 hours of 
consumption per day and the sustained rate is defined as eight hours of consumption per 
day (Chiarotti, 2007, 67). The Northrop Grumman (2010) study included various hours 
per day for equipment throughout the MAGTF scenarios (p. 74–75). The change was a 
best effort to provide a better approximation to “grossly outdated” data being used in the 
field (Northrop Grumman, 2010, p. 66–75). An assault is “to make a short, violent, but 
well-ordered attack against a local objective, such as a gun emplacement, a fort, or a 
machine gun nest” (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2016, p. 16). Sustained refers to the rate 
required “to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment” 
(JCS, 2016, p. 230). 
The concept of support addresses fuel sustainment in terms of stocks held at 
distribution points as each day progresses in the deliberate plan. The distribution points 
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are typically designed to match supported units to doctrinal sources of support. For 
example; an infantry regiment can be matched with a direct support combat logistics 
battalion, supporting companies may be matched to supported battalions, and supporting 
platoons to supported companies. The simplicity of the arrangement allows for units to be 
sustained with fuel by decentralized units with minimal oversight. This static plan allows 
for a synchronization of distribution assets that will flow fuel and distribution assets from 
their current locations to the planned locations. 
There are generally four static fuel points in a MEB’s battlespace. The main 
distribution point is the Amphibious Assault Expeditionary Fuel System (AAEFS) 
(Northrop Grumman, 2010). This fuel farm feeds two other major fuel points. The second 
is located in the Combat Logistics Support Area (CLSA), which is where the forward 
LCE supports ground combat operations. The third fuel point is at the Expeditionary 
Airfield and is the Tactical Airfield Fuel Distribution System (TAFDS). The TAFDS is a 
supply node that connects to the Forward Arming and Refuel Point (FARP) that employs 
the Helicopter Expedient Refueling System (HERS). 
As stated before, the doctrinal planning factors are integrated into deliberate plans 
months in advance of execution. Refinement of the plans occurs as forces and fuel are 
marshalled into theater. Generally speaking, deliberate plans transition from the 
operational to the tactical 30 days before execution. Typically, the transition is 
manifested in subordinate MAGTF elements generating deliberate plans based on the 
higher headquarters taskings. This nesting of plans is thought to ensure a unity of effort. 
Changes are dissiminated from higher headquarters in the form of fragmentary orders for 
operations.  
c. Future Operations 
In fuel sustainment, annexes are seldom updated. Rather, higher headquarters 
publishes guidance via informal channels such as email or chat. Inside of 30 days before 
fuel is delivered to a platform for consumption, the planning process takes place through 
ad hoc or scheduled collaboration. These processes are fed by logistics status reports that 
are updated daily. In more mature systems, the collaboration is controlled by automated 
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logistics information systems such as the Common Logistics Command and Control 
System (CLC2S) that can be updated in real time, but are analyzed on a daily cycle. 
d. Current Operations 
The following sections will describe the supply chain dynamics of the As-Is 
tactical fuel system. The activities that are focused on demand side management are 
referred to as fuel demand management and the activities that are focused on supply side 
management will be referred to as fuel distribution management. The integration and 
assessment of feedback between the two activities are referred to as bulk fuel command 
and control. The description of current practices will highlight information delays and 
distortions, which are target variables for fuel telematics in the E2C2S system 
development. 
e. Fuel Demand Management 
Demand is accounted by measuring fuel distributed to a vehicle or tank, which 
serves as feedback into the system. The data attributes typically include the vehicle serial 
number, company or battalion, time of receipt, and quantity distributed. The essence of 
demand management is ensuring that units are consuming fuel at expected rates and that 
fuel flows in the system are flexible enough to meet unforeseen changes to demand. 
However, Marines seldom compare demand forecasts to actual demand. 
 Demand management of fuel is achieved through a process of synchronization 
and controls that are established through support relationships within the MAGTF. A 
demand forecast enters the system in the form of an order for fuel from a battalion S-4. 
However, this information can be old and subject to time pressures placed by a desired 
immediacy of the chain of command (see Figure 18). While the data moves up the chain, 
the unit continues to burn fuel. To try to get ahead of this delay, the orders for fuel are 
projected two to three days ahead of required delivery based on inaccurate, distorted, and 
late information (Aten & Gallenson, 2014). The more mature MAGTF systems will 
utilize forecasting based on historic demands, which are known to only increase 
instability in the system (Saeed, 2009). 
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Figure 18.  Hypothetical Information Delay by Hours. 
The flow of information up the hierarchy is not only delayed, but it is distorted as 
different levels require conversions of data to different metrics. The information being 
reported deals with energy stores. The standard measure is gallons of fuel, as this allows 
for energy demands to be matched with supply (see Ch. II, p. 12). The information is 
distorted in three separate stages as it goes from the vehicle to the support coordination 
activities. The stages involve data synthesis, interpretation, and filtering. The purpose of 
the process is to get information to resource decision makers in a manner that attempts to 
balance simplicity with actuality. 
The first stage takes place within a vehicle section (see Figure 19). The driver 
visually reads the fuel gauge and assesses the fuel status. The data is mentally stored and 
may be verbally transmitted based on hitting what is perceived as an unanticipated low-
status as feedback which queries if the level is sufficient to make it to the next fueling 
opportunity. The driver typically interprets the fuel level as a fractional with step 
intervals from 1/8 to 1/4 of the tank capacity. The vehicle usually filters this status into 
one of four states: black (0-25%), red (25-50%), yellow (50-75%), and green (75-100%). 




Figure 19.  First Stage of Demand Reporting.  
The second stage is within the platoon. The platoon sergeant receives data from 
the section leaders, which is an average color of vehicles in the section. At this point, any 
unexpected colors are queried for details to evaluate the risk of running out of fuel. If the 
state is acceptable, the section leader makes a mental note, which is the average color of 
the sections. The information is relayed to the company as a color with details on any 
issues that require immediate attention.  
The final stage of demand reporting occurs between the company and battalion. 
There are scheduled daily logistics status reports and unscheduled rapid requests. The 
report gives a status of fuel in days of supply (DOS). A DOS is calculated by taking the 
quantity on hand and dividing it by the average quantity used in a day (Chiarotti, 2007, p. 
27). DOS is significant parameter as it functions as the inventory coverage time (see Ch. 
II, p.). The issue with DOS is that it’s always inaccurate as it is based on an average 
(Savage, 2003, p. 67–79). Savage (2003) suggests that a point estimate is only good for 
decision support if it comes with the variance and the knowledge of the sampling period. 
Standard reports at this level do not describe variance or the period averaged. 
Understanding the variance gives a decision maker insight on the risk involved by 
acting on the estimate. The variance represents how much error can be expected in a 
forecast, which puts a fuel demand manager in a difficult position. Given the information 
delays and distortions, how does one avoid the worst-case scenario without even knowing 
this window? The worst case is a unit running out of fuel that results in the loss of life or 
endangers mission accomplishment. So, it would be rational for demand managers to 
overestimate the requirements rather than underestimate as demonstrated by Chiarotti 
(2007) (Figure 20). The immediate consequences of this behavior are none. But, 
overestimation puts more convoys on the road and burns more energy moving unneeded 
fuel, reinforcing the lack of efficiency in the system. 
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Figure 20.  Estimate versus Actual Error. Source: Chiarotti (2007). 
f. Fuel Distribution Management 
Based on forecasts and registered demands, the LCE will flow bulk fuel 
distribution assets into the rear area. These assets are categorized into storage and 
transportation assets. A storage asset is an intermediate tank or bladder that ranges 
between five and 50,000-gallon capacity. Storage assets with less than or equal to 5,000 
gallons are capable of mobile loading. Transportation assets are platforms capable of 
mobile loading storage assets and delivering them to directed supply points on the 
battlefield. Examples include the MTVR, Logistics Vehicle Replacement Systems 
(LVSR), and the Semi-Trailer Refueler (M970). An asset that is categorized storage and 
transportation are pipelines. These include rigid and flexible hoses that vary in volume. 
Fuel distribution management at the battalion level is considered tactical fuel 
operations. That means the objective is getting fuel into the tanks of combat platforms 
using retail distributions. The unit S-4 will coordinate with the LCE S-3 to direct fuel 
resupplies to times and locations of subordinate units. After the supported unit issues the 
fuel, the supported unit uses the next logistics status report to record their demand, and 
the logistics section closes out the logistics support request to the operations section of 
the LCE. 
For sustainment lasting more than a few days, the LCE typically assigns a mobile 
tanker to temporarily attach to the supported unit. This is considered a service station 
method or point distribution as the mobile tanker functions as a temporary gas station. 
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The tanker will stay on station until fuel is depleted to 50%, at which point the supporting 
section heads back to fuel farm to top-off their tank and then return. 
The alternative resupply method for pushing fuel forward is tailgate issuing. The 
method involves the supporting unit linking up with the supported unit at a predetermined 
location. The mobile tanker fills the supported unit vehicle tanks and spare jugs and then 
completes the mission. In both cases, the fuel distributions are recorded by hand on 
standardized forms or in log books. The logs are used to account for fuel distributions and 
in training environments units are billed training funds based on the amount issued.  
g. Bulk Fuel Command and Control 
The quantity and urgency of demand are controlled by the priority of support. 
This priority is assigned by the MAGTF commander, via the MDDOC, as a means to 
rapidly resolve conflicts in resource allocation decisions. The supported units will send 
representatives daily to confirm outstanding orders or Logistics Support Requests (LSR). 
The LCE S-3 will take these inputs and create a logistics synchronization matrix. The 
matrix shows all the support actions scheduled to assigned support units to supported 
units. The matrix is used to validate logistics support requests that are received from the 
logistics sections of supported units. 
Once the units agree that the matrix is validated for support, the requests are 
translated into Logistics Support Orders (LSO) and tasked to transportation and supply 
units for action. A typical fuel distribution mission will involve a convoy, which includes 
fuel, to execute a distribution at a control point coordinated with the supported unit. The 
mission cycle includes two fuel demand signals (see Figure 21). The first is the bulk fuel 
that is going to the rapid replenishment point. The second demand signal is the retail fuel 
that is being distributed to the supported units before marshalling and after returning. 
 49 
 
Figure 21.  Typical Fuel Distribution Mission Cycle. Source: Chiarotti (2007). 
3. TO-BE TACTICAL FUEL OPERATIONS 
The objective of the E2C2S system is to maximize operational reach of the 
MAGTF through improved situational awareness and controls. The integrates different 
network components interact to form a cohesive system that acquires data and seamlessly 
delivers it to the MAGTF C2 node (see Figure 22). The concept builds off of several 
science and technology efforts to explore how logistics can be modernized on the 
battlefield, the key assumption held is that logisticians with perfect information and the 
right tools can meet demands as they emerge. 
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Figure 22.  Overview of Expeditionary Energy Command and Control System. 
Source: Prato (2015).  
a. Data Acquisition Technology 
In order to bring the concept into practice, there has been incremental 
development of sensors and network technology to create better information with a 
seamless path to decision makers. One aspect that has come up in repeated studies is the 
requirement for telematics that acquire the fuel status of a vehicle and transmit it from the 
platform. The idea can be drawn from the successful use of telematics in industrial 
control systems. Field Management Units (FMU) acquire data from sensors and then 
transfer and load the data into logic controllers that automate functions in the system to 
regulate behavior. 
The challenge is that the data acquisition devices, Automated Information 
Modules (AIMs), are not integrated into the design of the current fleet of tactical 
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vehicles. The MTVR does have a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus that collects 
telematics from the engine. An intermediate solution that is to use Commercial-Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) technology to fill the gap. 
FuelMaster is a vendor that already provides fuel accountability solutions to the 
Marine Corps and several defense labs joined to test the utility of their FMU mounted to 
an MTVR with a fuel pod. The FMU integrates with a hose system that measures flow 
and creates a data link with the AIM device on vehicles during retail distributions. The 
data acquired provides telematics information on the vehicle’s health and performance 
since the last reading. 
To utilize the data, the experiment incorporated a prototype of visualization 
software that extracts, loads, and transfers (ETL) the data into tables that can draw 
attention to high idle times, vehicles requiring maintenance, and an estimate of the fuel 
status and fuel efficiency of the vehicle during its mission. These experiments were still 
in proof-of-concept stages during the study, so there were not significant samples of data 
drawn to evaluate the utility of the data in a field setting. 
b. Potential Benefits 
Regardless, there are several other studies and initiatives that document the 
impact of fuel telematics along with considerations for the technology to be effective 
(Robison, 2015; Henton & Noack, 2015). One key component for successful 
implementation of vehicle health telematics is a logistics enterprise architecture, which 
has been designated as Global Combat Service Support (GCSS). The joint program 
directs services to develop information systems that ensure visibility of assets and their 
condition throughout the Defense Global Distribution Network (GDN). 
The concepts shift data genesis, interpretation, and filtering from humans to 
machines. Humans would still play a role in determining thresholds and prioritizing 
support, but all of the demand and supply management functions would be automated. 
The goal is to illuminate data delays and minimize distortion to a level where it is 
negligible and commanders are able to maximize their operational reach with the assets 
available. So, the benefit of telematics is not directly in the value of the new data, but 
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how it is incorporated in resource decisions throughout the organization (Pedro-
Dagoberto, 2013). 
c. Technology Risks 
However, like any information technology endeavor, the goals of the future 
system technologies face steep obstacles. The Marines are continuously training and 
operating real world missions with equipment that is worn from waging two wars over 
the last 15 years. The GCSS Marine Corps Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) tool has 
been met with many cost and time overruns; which creates a requirement for commands 
to adopt more technologies to bridge legacy systems and middleware that may increase 
fragility in information systems. 
Also, partial implementation of resource decision making policy in the tactical 
supply chain would undermine benefits (Pedro-Dagoberto, 2013). The reason being that 
optimized supply chain technologies require synchronization that behave like rowing 
crews in a way. If one node does not adjust according to the changes in demand at the 
retail end, the entire supply chain suffers from the disruption. 
While the Marine Corps continues to win battles, E2C2S system development 
requires more clarity on what factors sensors should be focused on. The following section 
conducts quantitative analysis of the effects of fuel telematics and will attempt to provide 
insight on harmonizing the technology developments with changes in structure and policy 
to enable greater operational reach for the MAGTF. 
B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. Introduction 
In research and development, cost and schedule risks are common obstacles that 
threaten the success of a program. Computer simulations are useful tools to mitigate risks 
during technology maturation, as they quickly evaluate options without expending 
resources on physical options. Previous studies suggest that fleet telematics can unlock a 
competitive edge for business, but the caveat is that the data does not add value on its 
own. How data is incorporated into decision-making and acted on is a critical factor that 
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needs consideration in control system design and engineering (Robison, 2015). The 
following section establishes two simulation models: an As-Is and a To-Be that are based 
on the data from the qualitative analysis section. 
The models are designed to simulate and reproduce symptoms of unstable supply 
chain dynamics, which are primarily characterized with stocks that exhibit behavior of 
oscillation with high amplitudes (Sterman, 2000). The problem with fuel consumption in 
the Marines is that commanders are unable to determine how their decisions are impacted 
by fuel. So, any deviation in consumption patterns creates situations of unforeseen high 
demand and situations where there is insufficient capacity to accept distributions.  
The Beer Distribution Game inspired the idea of using simulation software to 
replicate these dynamics in a model of a tactical fuel supply chain. The modeling process 
steps include problem articulation, formulating a dynamic hypothesis, formulating a 
simulation model and testing (Sterman, 2000). The finding and conclusions will address 
the policy design, evaluation, and recommendations. 
2. Problem Articulation 
The problem is that dynamic demand creates the need for high inventory coverage 
of fuel for sustained tactical operations in the Marine Corps. The dynamic demand 
creates a high level of variance in unit fuel stocks and fuel distribution missions. This is a 
problem because the growth of fuel requirements has a positive relationship with the 
footprint of the MAGTF sustainment ‘tail’. While fuel resupplies are in high amounts, 
distribution assets have low utilization rates. The result is a MAGTF with reduced 
operational reach and increased vulnerability by presenting adversaries with high-value 
targets in the form of large supply convoys. 
The qualitative analysis suggests the root cause of the dynamic demand is poor 
demand side management decisions within supply nodes. A single node may operate 
efficient to local policy (see Figure 17), but in reality the node is subject to delays in 
information and fuel flows of interdependent loops that form the supply chain (see Figure 
23). Delays cause a phase shift of demand and distribution responses, which leads to 
amplification of inventory corrections.  
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Figure 23.  Causal Loop Diagram, High-Order Goal Seeking Fuel Supply and 
Demand. 
The fuel supply chain (see Figure 23) is a cycle that flows fuel forward through 
distributions to reduce demands. The platoon activity at the right are the consumer or 
customers of the supply chain. The goal of the feedback loop (B1) is introduced as the 
Desired Plt Fuel Level; demand is the difference between the goal and perceived fuel 
level. There is a small delay, of 12–24 hours for the demand to form into an order for 
fuel. Orders are transformed into distributions by the next variable in the causal loop 
chain, which is the artillery battery for the platoon.  
The staff functions and alignment create an iterative sequence of loops. Above the 
consumer is the retail supply activity or battery. The battery’s demands are satisfied by 
the combat trains that distribute from the battalion stocks (B2). The battalion and its 
combat trains function as a distributor. The distributor’s demands are met by the 
wholesaler through field trains (B3). The field trains draw fuel from the MEB stocks at 
the AAEFS. The MEB is designed to function for 30 days without external resupply; 
while they may have an external supply activity acting as the factory role, the study is 
focused on the dynamics within the MEB supply chain. 
The causal loops are interdependent since the distributions at each level drive the 
goal seeking behavior in the level below, while the distributions simultaneous drive the 
stock at their respective level away from its goal, creating a demand. Accordingly, each 
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loop has counterbalancing processes that communicate supply and demand. The supply 
side management decisions involve the quantity and frequency of distributions and are 
constrained by the capacity and flow limits of each stock and flow. The demand side 
management decisions involve reporting demand and deciding how much to order. 
3. Formulating a Dynamic Hypothesis 
The independent variables must be within the control of the either the supply or 
demand side management decisions. The variables that have the highest potential 
increase operational reach are the inventory adjustment times and the inventory coverage. 
Information delays create phase shifts in demand and supply signals. These delays 
interact with inventory coverage goals by creating a perception of high error between the 
current state and the desired state of the inventory. The demand side decision is to 
increase demand without regard to the fuel already being loaded and transferred in a 
distribution mission via a supply train (see Table 2). 
Table 2.   Relationship Between Information Delay & Inventory Coverage on 
Operational Reach.  
 High inventory coverage 
Desired stock => 2 DOS 
Low inventory coverage 
Desired stock < 2 DOS 
High information delay 
Time delay => 1.0 days 
High oscillation/ no 
operational impact 
High oscillation/ high 
operational impact 
Low information delay 
Time delay = 0.0 days 
Low oscillation/ no 
operational impact 
Low oscillation/ low 
operational impact 
 
Oscillations are symptomatic of goal seeking systems with information delays. 
The behavior of the stocks in the system can reveal the elasticity or resilience the system 
has to a perturbation. A perturbation would be any change from a state of equilibrium. 
The system’s ability to approach equilibrium (achieve the goal) can be measured by the 
amplitude of the phase shift on subsequent stocks as well as the time it takes for the 
system to recover equilibrium (Sterman, 2000; Abdel-Hamid, personal communication, 
February 29, 2016). 
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4. Formulating a Simulation Model 
The model of the fuel supply chain has two categories; the flow path of the fuel 
and the flow path of the demand. To create a controlled experiment, certain assumptions 
must be made to reduce noise or extraneous factors to variables being tested. Several 
assumptions were adopted for the model (see Table 3). 
Table 3.   Modeling Assumptions. 
Stock and flows are unidirectional 
Stocks are nonnegative 
Distribution capacities are unlimited 
Every source of demand belongs to a single platoon/battery/battalion/regiment/MEB 
Distributions at the platoon level are instantaneous (loop omitted) 
Orders originate and close at the battery/company level 
Simulation takes place within the MEBs 30 day design 
Demand and supply flow is stable (deterministic) 
Fuel distributions are discrete events. 
Model is specified to run over 30 Days with 0.5 step increments 
Stock unit of measure is Gallons 
 
The building blocks of a supply chain are goal-seeking loops that balance the 
acquisition and loss rate of a stock. The basic model of a fuel stock and flow was built 
and tested in equilibrium. Once this was achieved, a discrete conveyor was added to 
represent the distribution delay in the supply line. Conveyors carry a stock between 
processes and these were set with a transit time of one day and constrained to the stock 
limit at the receiving end. Additionally, a delay was formed to represent the average day 
it takes for demand to be converted into an order between the desired arrival rate and 
order rate at the left side of variables. 
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Figure 24.  Second-Order Supply System with Distribution and Delay. 
Adapted from Sterman (2000). 
The retail level of the supply chain (see Figure 24) is represented by the artillery 
battery stock and flows. The stock is equal to the integral of the receive and issue rates. 
The variable is initialized to equal the initial battery issue at time (0) and the unit of 
measure is gallons. The modeling software automatically makes the unit of measure at 
the flows Gallons/Days, which drives the units of measure for the proceeding 
formulations. 
Btry =  (BtryIssue - BtryRecieve) 
The demand signal originates with the distributions to the platoons. These are 
represented as the exogenous variable issuedPlts. In equilibrium, this variable is equal to 
9,600 Gallons. To perturb the system from equilibrium, the following formulation was 
used. 
issuedPlts = 9600 - STEP(600, 5) 
Similar to the Beer Distribution Game, the perturbation on the system is a single 
impulse on the fifth day where demand drops down from the assault rate to the sustained 
rate (Chiarotti, 2007). The issue rate is equal to the issuedPlts variable. The demand is 
then fed into expected loss (EL), which is the forecasting technique that averages the 
previous three days’ demands. 
EL = SMTH1(issuedPlts, 3) 
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The output is the expected losses for the day in gallons. The demand then goes 
through an inventory correction policy. The desired inventory coverage is the number of 
days the stock must have as a buffer against dynamic demand. This is the battery’s 
operational reach (BtryOpReach), for the purpose of this model, it was initialized at three 
days. The expected loss is then multiplied by the inventory coverage to form the desired 
battery stock level (DBtry). 
DBtry = EL * BtryOpReach 
The inventory adjustment (ABtry) is the difference between the desired and 
battery stock averaged by the battery stock adjustment time (BtryAT). 
ABtry = (DBtry - Btry)/BtryAT 
The gallons/days are then added to the expected loss to form the desired arrival 
rate (DArrival from CT). At this point in the process, the demand has reached the 
transition point where it becomes an order in the system. This is accomplished by 
applying a delay before it is submitted to the battalion logistics section (OrderRateS4) for 
fulfillment. 
Order delay = DELAY(DArrival from CT, 1.0) 
Once the order hits the logistics section it is fulfilled in the next day’s battalion 
combat train, which sustains the battery positions. For the purpose of this simulation, the 
battery can accept up to 18,000 gallons in a shipment and is assumed to not have a 
capacity limit. 
The supply chain replicates its structure and behavior at the artillery battalion, 
which represents the distributor. The difference with the battalion is that it is sustained by 
field trains, which draw fuel from the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) stocks and 
carry them forward to the supported battalions. The MEB stock represents the wholesaler 
and for the purpose of the tactical scenario, the theater source (factory) is omitted since 
the problem is focused on the 30-day organic stocks carried by the MEB. 
To formulate the To-Be model, the desired arrival rate from the combat trains has 
no delay. This represents the autonomous flow of demand gained with telematics. Also, 
the To-Be model assumes a near-real time sharing of consumption data within the MEB. 
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Accordingly, the stock adjustments from the battery level are summed into the stock 
adjustments of all nodes up the fuel chain for their next distribution. 
5. Testing 
Once the As-Is and To-Be models were calibrated, a 30-day simulation was ran 
with identical variable settings, the To-Be model having zero delays. 
 
 
Figure 25.  As-Is Versus To-Be Stock Behavior. 
The battery-level stock behavior of the As-Is versus To-Be systems (see Figure 
25) are shown relative to each other. The battery oscillations increase in amplitude 
throughout the 30-day period, ranging between 15k - 40k gallons. The To-Be model 
oscillations show signs of damping and approach equilibrium after the 13th day.  
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Figure 26.  As-Is Versus To-Be MEB Stock Behavior. 
Both models were initialized with a 30-day supply of fuel for the battery at the 
assault rate. Consumption for both models was linear while the MEB stock showed 
oscillation as it was nearly depleted at the end of the period. The As-Is model stocks 
finished at 36k gallons while the To-Be model was down to 14k gallons (see Figure 26). 
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Figure 27.  As-Is Versus To-Be stock Adjustments at Battalion and Battery-
Level. 
The stock adjustments are calculated at each step increment, which would be 
twice a day. This is consistent reporting behavior observed in a field environment. The 
As-Is adjustments reflect the same behavior mode as the stock behavior (see Figure 27). 
Negative values for adjustments are explained by surpluses in the stock, or when the 
stock exceeds the desired stock amount. 
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Figure 28.  As Is Versus To-Be Conveyor Stocks. 
The conveyors acted at the distribution convoys in the tactical fuel supply chain. 
These exhibited the same mode of behavior as the stocks in the As-Is and To-Be systems 
(see Figure 28). Conveyors are a type of stock; in this model, they are non-negative as 
surpluses are not carried back up the supply chain. A zero stock represents a step where 
there is no fuel taken from the supply node down to the next node in the supply chain. 
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Figure 29.  Sensitivity of Battery Stock to Information Delay, As Is Model. 
The sensitivity analysis was conducted in two trials observing the battery and 
battalion stocks for the As-Is model. The order delay parameter was incrementally varied 
from 0.0-2.0 in 0.5 steps (see Figures 29 and 30). Of note, stocks were initialized at 28.8k 
gallons (or 3 DOS) and conveyors were initialized at 9,600 gallons. 
It is apparent in the sensitivity analysis that the information and supply delays at 
the battery-level created a “bullwhip” effect on the oscillations at the battalion-level. As 
delays increase, the phase shift to the right is apparent and the amplitudes at the battalion 
level show exponential or compounded growth with each increase of delay greater than 
0.5 Days. While these findings are consistent with the reported dysfunctional symptoms 
of tactical supply chain, it is important to note that the experiment purposely controlled 
for exogenous variables. There is no weather, randomness, or other logistics factors 
acting on the supply system; yet, the As-Is model behaved in an unstable manner. The 
following chapter will dig deeper into the implications of this for military supply systems 
along with recommendations for the implementation of data acquisition technologies 
(telematics). 
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V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
1. Hypothesis Testing 
The hypothesis testing found that the As-Is model, with high information delay 
and high inventory coverage, did exhibit greater amplitude of oscillation than the To-Be 
model. When inventory coverage was less than three days for the battalion, operational 
reach was disrupted despite the MEB still having an ample stock. The behavior is a result 
of instability of the system. Even with a relatively small perturbation, a 7% decrease in 
demand, the As-Is system battalion stocks were depleted in the sensitivity analysis when 
the delay was greater than or equal to 1.5 days. 
The low information delay on the As-Is model allowed for a 0.95 DOS coverage 
at the battery and 2.8 DOS coverage at the battalion without stocks being depleted. So, 
the battery did perform better than expected in the As-Is model.  
The stability of the To-Be system was observed to be nominally resilient as it was 
able to achieve 95% equilibrium at the battery by day 13. The As-Is system showed 
increasing instability up to the 30-day mark. The peak amplitude of the battery reached 
28k gallons, while the battalion peaked at 48k gallons. The As-Is battery peaked at 36k 
gallons and the battalion peaked 62k gallons. The 171% amplification in the To-Be and 
172% amplification in the As-Is models are consistent with expectations based on 
previous supply chain dynamic cases  
The sensitivity analysis on time delay with the As-Is model demonstrated that 
increasing the delay had a positive effect on amplification, making the model less stable. 
One notable observation was that in the As-Is model, the battalion had low impact to 
operations only when information delay was zero, otherwise there were periods of high 
operational impact. 
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2. Potential Impact on Operational Reach 
The operational reach of the MEB is decreased with fully implemented 
telematics; based on the As-Is system finishing the model with 21k gallons more than the 
To-Be model. While this was an unexpected result, exploration of parameters provided 
some insight on how these findings can be explained by the assumptions of the model. 
First, the model assumed distribution capacities equaled the capacity of the units– 
meaning that sustainment trains (conveyors) could always fulfill demand and the 
battalion could receive this fuel as it arrived. Looking at the operational tempo in the As-
Is model, the field trains would deliver 21k gallons and the following mission was eight 
days later at 30k gallons. To put it in perspective, the same demand signal was answered 
in the To-Be model with a 16k gallon delivery with a two-day pause before an 18k gallon 
delivery.  
The As-Is model is able to extend its operational reach further in time than the 
To-Be model because it is working harder with a lower utilization rate on the equipment. 
This resulted in oscillations that led to As-Is model periods where more fuel was reserved 
in the supply line. The reality is that field trains would struggle to lift the 30k gallons in a 
day and would most likely create a backlog or have to double mission rate, which would 
double the cost of delivering fuel that day. The second-order effect would be that the 
battalion and battery would have to increase their inventory coverage to compensate for 
the increased delays, which would create a reinforcing feedback loop that exponentially 
created higher demands on the field trains. 
The To-Be model is a more resilient system that shows very little risk to 
operations based on fuel consumption. This potentially increases operational tempo and 
advantage against adversaries. The To-Be model finished the 30 days with 13k gallons 
and the As-Is model finished with 34k gallons. However, the telematics are useful 
beyond synchronizing the inventory adjustments along the supply chain. If commanders 
are able to improve fuel efficiency by 7% across the vehicle in the MEB, they would 
finish the simulation with 36k gallons. 
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B. LIMITATIONS 
The simulation was limited in its approximation of reality. This was intentional, 
but it is noted that a more accurate simulator would behave as a micro-world – accurately 
capturing consumption variance, weather, load configurations, and other logistics 
considerations. Also, the technology theorized in the model are more mature than the 
architecture being prototyped at the time of this study. Therefore, adoption of telematics 
would require further development. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Material and Non-Material Solutions 
With regard to operational reach, the findings of this study suggest very limited 
benefits for the Marine Corps through implementing telematics. Telematics that are fully 
integrated into the vehicle fleet will likely lead to increased operational tempo and more 
reliable supply lines—which will most likely increase fuel consumption activities. 
Telematics will give logisticians and commanders better visibility of their energy 
performance, but there is no evidence of a causal factor that would lead to decreased 
consumption in combat unless information was used to restrict maneuver or limit the 
advance of forward troops. 
Demand signals acquired via telematics will require an overhaul of how supply 
and demand side management are executed in a tactical environment. Right now, Marines 
schedule a resupply push or they pull it on demand. Both scenarios use delayed and 
distorted data and result in unstable supply chain behavior. With increased automation 
and process re-engineering, data for all classes of supply should be entering the system 
with more velocity. Stock adjustments should be automated with human intervention 
minimized. 
On the other hand, the advantages in the To-Be model suggest higher utilization 
of distribution assets that require lower lift capacity. This does suggest that “tail” or 
logistics footprint of the MAGTF can be leaned or reduced if amplitude maxima is 
reduced for lift requirements. Also, the company and higher echelon units are able to 
operate with smaller inventory coverage; even if they are disrupted due to exogenous 
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factors, the To-Be system’s behavior mode has a better ability to rapidly absorb changes 
in demand. 
While emergency resupply capacity is a must in combat, humans are victims of 
bounded rationality when it comes to managing supply chains as separate nodes. People 
tend to make sound decisions with the information they have at hand, at the expense of 
the system outside their purview (Sterman, 2000). To create a hierarchy that collaborates 
over adjustments would increase process layers and complexity.  
To counter the organizational resistance in the supply and distribution occupation 
fields, the Marine Corps should invigorate the entry and intermediate-level formal 
schools with the lessons learned about supply chains. While many Marines are quick to 
point at bad reporting, weather, or uncertainty as root causes for dysfunction, it is more 
likely that it is the structure and design of the resource decisions within that create 
systemic dysfunction. Also, commercial off the shelf solutions need to measure for 
alignment and fit into current processes. The more the organization needs to change to fit 
a technology they had no hand in developing, there may be a greater risk for low 
adoption rates. 
2. Focus Data Aggregation on Bottom-up Approach 
Effects of distortion were omitted from the design of the simulation. This is 
because distortions from data transformations, translations, and error are all noise in the 
information system. While decision makers may prefer dealing with DOS to dealing with 
gallons, data should never be propagated as a less accurate approximation. The best 
quality sensor data should always be propagated forward with as much integrity to its 
origin as possible. This makes aggregations more resilient to error propagation.  
The principle of timing in computer science is an excellent example. The system 
clock in the core of a computer does not keep time by Gregorian or any other calendar. 
The time is kept as a continuous interval with 100-nanosecond steps from epoch on 1 
January 1970 00:00:00. Whenever a user sees a date, that is an abstraction converted by a 
higher level of the operating system. By keeping the kernel data as an interval, 
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bookkeeping is made computationally trivial when it comes to adjusting, comparing, and 
computing time. 
Until sensors and computers totally automate stock management, Marines should 
focus on finding safe tactics, techniques, and procedures for measuring bulk fluids. The 
success of telematics in the vehicle fleet are interdependent with the data quality and 
resource decisions made with regards to intermediate storage. 
D. FUTURE STUDIES 
1. Field Experiment to Measure Cognitive Loads to Assess Return on 
Knowledge 
With the push to control dynamic supply chains, there will be a need for increased 
automation, process improvement, and re-engineering. Some developments may find 
opportunities to gain benefits by shifting workload onto customer units; roles being 
discussed include drivers, platoon commanders, and logistics specialists. In order to 
measure the return on investment, there needs to be an understanding of the current and 
future cognitive loads carried by these actors. These efforts may benefit from a study that 
surveys both customer and supply support roles along with leaders of these units to get a 
better understanding of the cognitive loads associated with target processes.  
2. Field Experiment to Measure Information Distortion in Fuel 
Performance 
While this study collected qualitative data on information distortion in fuel 
performance processes, a quantitative would provide a better approximation of the impact 
on resource decisions. It is possible that the distortions have a negligible effect when 
compared to the time delays and changing the color-coded reporting may increase supply 
chain dysfunctions.   
3. User-based Collaborative Design of User Interfaces for E2C2S 
The users who will be in the occupation fields charged with executing 
Expeditionary Energy Command and Control should be included in the development of 
user interfaces with resource decision system. The inclusion of users early on may 
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increase the chances of success implementation and improve adoption rates within the 
organization. 
4. Case Study of Information System Maturity Model for Combat 
As the battle concepts in the military become more computerized, the operational 
plans are updated to reflect capabilities advertised by the combat developers. While 
technology has evolved, combat still drags units into the age of manual and analog 
protocols on a regular basis. Additionally, the U. S. faces non-conventional cyber-threats. 
This reaffirms that there is no single military information system. The information system 
is constantly in flux as it relates to technology and organizational maturity. The military 
services are in need of an Information System Maturity Model for Combat. While Marine 
Corps telecommunications have standards for establishing services by time, when and 
how automated information systems are introduced on the battlefield are not widely 
discussed. A model may help in guiding operational concepts, training, and development 
of technology performance parameters in the future. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Marine Corps has an opportunity to engineer near-real-time consumption data 
into every node of the tactical supply chain. This new concept of total demand visibility 
is alluring for the potential benefits that can be achieved with optimized tactical supply 
chains. While operational tempo, agility, and supply chain stability may improve; there is 
little evidence that fuel data will extend operational reach if its implantation is limited to 
resource decisions within the supply chain. Combat units must find ways to identify 
waste or other opportunities to reduce footprint using analytical potential that emerges 
when information delays are eliminated and telematics perform data acquisition for the 
information system. 
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APPENDIX. A. SIMULATION DATA 























0 0 0 288000 288000 28800 28800 28800 28800 
1 9600 9600 278400 273600 28800 31200 28800 28800 
2 19200 19200 271200 262133 31200 36000 28800 26400 
3 28800 28800 261600 249370 28800 35467 26400 26400 
4 38400 38400 257333 233007 28800 36830 26400 28800 
5 48000 48000 249770 221277 21067 44193 26400 30600 
6 57000 57000 238785 219598 16630 48473 29400 30600 
7 66000 66000 220785 219598 16565 42925 32400 29050 
8 75000 75000 202785 217591 27187 34430 34450 27278 
9 84000 84000 184785 205379 41276 26755 32828 26772 
10 93000 93000 178988 187379 56806 29358 27739 27454 
11 102000 102000 178988 174055 57858 38654 21209 28062 
12 111000 111000 178988 170785 47580 43777 16953 27767 
13 120000 120000 178988 170167 31225 38444 18232 26968 
14 129000 129000 178988 162044 13225 29766 25587 26571 
15 138000 138000 162141 145573 0 28418 34587 26867 
16 147000 147000 144141 130149 9672 35828 38812 27338 
17 156000 156000 126141 123283 26934 42599 36986 27399 
18 165000 165000 108141 121664 44934 40763 28724 27052 
19 174000 174000 106115 116070 61534 33322 19724 26754 
20 183000 183000 106115 102906 54015 29650 12125 26814 
21 192000 192000 106115 87857 36015 33683 12670 27081 
22 201000 201000 106115 78155 18015 39855 21670 27211 
23 210000 210000 92840 73931 15 40745 30670 27088 
24 219000 219000 74840 68948 8551 36003 39670 26899 
25 228000 228000 56840 58677 23885 31862 35409 26866 
26 237000 237000 38840 45308 41885 33024 29076 26990 
27 246000 246000 33984 34288 58376 37416 20076 27100 
28 255000 255000 33984 27582 54055 39537 12585 27077 
29 264000 264000 33984 21923 36055 37295 12760 26975 










































0 19200 19200 9600 9600 19200 19200 9600 19200 9600 9600 
1 9600 19200 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600 13600 9600 9600 
2 9600 13600 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600 12178 9600 12000 
3 9600 12178 9600 9600 9600 12000 4000 16323 9600 12000 
4 4000 16323 9600 9600 9600 12000 7378 14269 12000 9600 
5 7378 14269 9000 9000 12000 9600 8057 3359 12000 7800 
6 8057 3359 9000 9000 12000 7800 19195 0 12000 7067 
7 19195 0 9000 9000 12000 7067 25997 0 8267 8107 
8 25997 0 9000 9000 8267 8107 26436 9353 4757 9526 
9 26436 9353 9000 9000 4757 9526 11593 18672 2354 9786 
10 11593 18672 9000 9000 2354 9786 0 16049 3730 8933 
11 0 16049 9000 9000 3730 8933 0 5496 8649 8207 
12 0 5496 9000 9000 8649 8207 0 0 15060 8420 
13 0 0 9000 9000 15060 8420 0 5547 19234 9162 
14 0 5547 9000 9000 19234 9162 8978 15316 17898 9519 
15 8978 15316 9000 9000 17898 9519 36000 17046 8978 9196 
16 36000 17046 9000 9000 8978 9196 36000 9122 1476 8705 
17 36000 9122 9000 9000 1476 8705 33768 1772 0 8631 
18 33768 1772 9000 9000 0 8631 4052 3670 0 8969 
19 4052 3670 9000 9000 0 8969 0 11649 7297 9261 
20 0 11649 9000 9000 7297 9261 0 15673 16290 9196 
21 0 15673 9000 9000 16290 9196 0 11483 23885 8926 
22 0 11483 9000 9000 23885 8926 2557 4949 23337 8794 
23 2557 4949 9000 9000 23337 8794 30117 3949 2587 8916 
24 30117 3949 9000 9000 2587 8916 36000 8912 5334 9103 
25 36000 8912 9000 9000 5334 9103 35558 13296 0 9135 
26 35558 13296 9000 9000 0 9135 9710 12134 593 9011 
27 9710 12134 9000 9000 593 9011 0 7556 6925 8901 
28 0 7556 9000 9000 6925 8901 0 5311 15925 8924 
29 0 5311 9000 9000 15925 8924 0 7618 23416 9025 
Fin
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0 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600 9600 
1 9600 9600 9600 4000 9600 7200 9600 14400 9600 9600 
2 9600 12000 4000 178 7200 9600 7200 11467 9600 9600 
3 12000 12000 7378 4323 9600 12000 9600 12763 9600 9600 
4 12000 9600 8057 4669 9600 11400 4267 16363 9600 9600 
5 12000 7800 19195 -4441 12000 9000 7563 11730 9000 9000 
6 8267 7067 25997 -11801 12000 7450 10985 1680 9000 9000 
7 4757 8107 26436 -8606 11050 7228 18000 0 9000 9000 
8 2354 9526 11593 -173 7378 8494 18000 2007 9000 9000 
9 3730 9786 -9659 8886 3911 9682 18000 12211 9000 9000 
10 8649 8933 -31818 7116 2470 9608 5797 18000 9000 9000 
11 15060 8207 -34594 -2711 4745 8705 0 13324 9000 9000 
12 19234 8420 -18681 -8794 10278 8201 0 3270 9000 9000 
13 17898 9162 8978 -3615 16355 8603 0 618 9000 9000 
14 10503 9519 36556 5797 18000 9296 0 8123 9000 9000 
15 1476 9196 50215 7850 13225 9471 16847 16471 9000 9000 
16 -2768 8705 33768 417 7175 9061 18000 15424 9000 9000 
17 -956 8631 4052 -6859 738 8653 18000 6866 9000 9000 
18 7297 8969 -23416 -5299 0 8702 18000 1619 9000 9000 
19 16290 9261 -44723 2388 1400 9060 2026 5594 9000 9000 
20 23885 9196 -30425 6476 9545 9267 0 13164 9000 9000 
21 23337 8926 2557 2556 18000 9130 0 15049 9000 9000 
22 14335 8794 30117 -3845 18000 8877 0 9702 9000 9000 
23 5334 8916 54817 -4966 18000 8812 13276 4225 9000 9000 
24 -3667 9103 35558 -191 4739 8967 18000 4983 9000 9000 
25 593 9135 9710 4161 2667 9124 18000 10271 9000 9000 
26 6925 9011 -18555 3123 0 9109 18000 13369 9000 9000 
27 15925 8901 -40228 -1346 1509 8977 4855 11020 9000 9000 
28 23416 8924 -29989 -3613 9175 8898 0 6706 9000 9000 
29 23240 9025 2888 -1407 18000 8949 0 5658 9000 9000 
Fin
al 
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APPENDIX B. SIMULATION MODEL DIAGRAM 
 
Figure 30.  As-Is and To-Be Simulation Design 
.
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APPENDIX C. XMILE SIMULATION MODEL FORMULATION 
Top-Level Model:   
“As-Is_Fuel_Consumed”(t) = “As-Is_Fuel_Consumed”(t - dt) + (BtryIssue_AsIs) * dt  
INIT “As-Is_Fuel_Consumed” = 0  
INFLOWS:  
BtryIssue_AsIs = issuedPlts_AsIs  
“As-Is_MEB_30_DOS”(t) = “As-Is_MEB_30_DOS”(t - dt) + ( - OrderRateCLB_AsIs) * 
dt  
INIT “As-Is_MEB_30_DOS” = 9600*30  
OUTFLOWS:  
OrderRateCLB_AsIs = Order_delay_CLB  
Bn_AsIs(t) = Bn_AsIs(t - dt) + (BnRecieve_AsIs - OrderRateS4_AsIs) * dt  
INIT Bn_AsIs = DBn_AsIs  
INFLOWS:  
BnRecieve_AsIs = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
OUTFLOWS:  
OrderRateS4_AsIs = Order_delay_Bn  
Bn_ToBe(t) = Bn_ToBe(t - dt) + (BnRecieve_ToBe - OrderRateS4_ToBe) * dt  
INIT Bn_ToBe = DBn_ToBe  
INFLOWS:  
BnRecieve_ToBe = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
OUTFLOWS:  
OrderRateS4_ToBe = DArrival_from_CT_ToBe  
“Btry_As-Is”(t) = “Btry_As-Is”(t - dt) + (BtryRecieve_AsIs - BtryIssue_AsIs) * dt  
INIT “Btry_As-Is” = DBtry_AsIs  
INFLOWS:  
BtryRecieve_AsIs = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
OUTFLOWS:  
BtryIssue_AsIs = issuedPlts_AsIs  
“Btry_To-Be”(t) = “Btry_To-Be”(t - dt) + (BtryRecieveToBe - BtryIssueToBe) * dt  
INIT “Btry_To-Be” = DBtry_ToBe  
INFLOWS:  
BtryRecieveToBe = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
OUTFLOWS:  
BtryIssueToBe = issuedPlts_ToBe  
Combat_Train_AsIs(t) = Combat_Train_AsIs(t - dt) + (OrderRateS4_AsIs - 
BtryRecieve_AsIs) * dt  
INIT Combat_Train_AsIs = 9600  
TRANSIT TIME = 1  
CAPACITY = INF  
INFLOW LIMIT = 18000  
INFLOWS:  
OrderRateS4_AsIs = Order_delay_Bn  
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OUTFLOWS:  
BtryRecieve_AsIs = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
Combat_Train_ToBe(t) = Combat_Train_ToBe(t - dt) + (OrderRateS4_ToBe - 
BtryRecieveToBe) * dt  
INIT Combat_Train_ToBe = 9600  
TRANSIT TIME = 1  
CAPACITY = INF  
INFLOW LIMIT = 18000  
INFLOWS:  
OrderRateS4_ToBe = DArrival_from_CT_ToBe  
OUTFLOWS:  
BtryRecieveToBe = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
Field_Train_AsIs(t) = Field_Train_AsIs(t - dt) + (OrderRateCLB_AsIs - 
BnRecieve_AsIs) * dt  
INIT Field_Train_AsIs = 9600  
TRANSIT TIME = 1  
CAPACITY = INF  
INFLOW LIMIT = 18000  
INFLOWS:  
OrderRateCLB_AsIs = Order_delay_CLB  
OUTFLOWS:  
BnRecieve_AsIs = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
Field_Train_ToBe(t) = Field_Train_ToBe(t - dt) + (OrderRateCLB_ToBe - 
BnRecieve_ToBe) * dt  
INIT Field_Train_ToBe = 9600  
TRANSIT TIME = 1  
CAPACITY = INF  
INFLOW LIMIT = 18000  
INFLOWS:  
OrderRateCLB_ToBe = DArrival_from_CT_ToBe+DArrival_from_FT_ToBe  
OUTFLOWS:  
BnRecieve_ToBe = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
“To-Be_Fuel_Consumed”(t) = “To-Be_Fuel_Consumed”(t - dt) + (BtryIssueToBe) * dt  
INIT “To-Be_Fuel_Consumed” = 0  
INFLOWS:  
BtryIssueToBe = issuedPlts_ToBe  
“To-Be_MEB_30_DOS”(t) = “To-Be_MEB_30_DOS”(t - dt) + ( - 
OrderRateCLB_ToBe) * dt  
INIT “To-Be_MEB_30_DOS” = 9600*30  
OUTFLOWS:  
OrderRateCLB_ToBe = DArrival_from_CT_ToBe+DArrival_from_FT_ToBe  
ABn_AsIs = (DBn_AsIs-Bn_AsIs)/BnAT_AsIs  
ABn_ToBe = (DBn_ToBe-Bn_ToBe)/BnAT_ToBe  
ABtry_AsIs = (DBtry_AsIs-”Btry_As-Is”)/BtryAT_AsIs  
ABtry_ToBe = (DBtry_ToBe-”Btry_To-Be”)/BtryAT_ToBe  
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BnAT_AsIs = 1  
BnAT_ToBe = 1  
BnOpReach_AsIs = 3  
BnOpReach_ToBe = 3  
BtryAT_AsIs = 1  
BtryAT_ToBe = 1  
BtryOpReach_AsIs = 3  
BtryOpReach_ToBe = 3  
DArrival_from_CT_AsIs = EL_Btry_AsIs+ABtry_AsIs  
DArrival_from_CT_ToBe = EL_Btry_ToBe+ABtry_ToBe  
DArrival_from_FT_AsIs = EL_Bn_AsIs+ABn_AsIs  
DArrival_from_FT_ToBe = EL_Bn_ToBe+ABn_ToBe  
DBn_AsIs = EL_Bn_AsIs*BnOpReach_AsIs  
DBn_ToBe = EL_Bn_ToBe*BnOpReach_ToBe  
DBtry_AsIs = EL_Btry_AsIs*BtryOpReach_AsIs  
DBtry_ToBe = EL_Btry_ToBe*BtryOpReach_ToBe  
EL_Bn_AsIs = SMTH1(OrderRateS4_AsIs, 3)  
EL_Bn_ToBe = SMTH1(OrderRateS4_ToBe, 3)  
EL_Btry_AsIs = SMTH1(issuedPlts_AsIs, 3)  
EL_Btry_ToBe = SMTH1(issuedPlts_ToBe, 3)  
issuedPlts_AsIs = 9600-STEP(600, 5)  
issuedPlts_ToBe = 9600-STEP(600, 5)  
Order_delay_Bn = DELAY(DArrival_from_CT_AsIs, Order_delay_time)  
Order_delay_CLB = DELAY(DArrival_from_FT_AsIs, Order_delay_time)  
Order_delay_time = 1  
    
First_Order_Supply_Node:  
S(t) = S(t - dt) + (AR - LR) * dt  
INIT S = DS  
INFLOWS:  
AR = DAR  
OUTFLOWS:  
LR = O  
AS = (DS-S)/S_AdjTm  
CS = 3  
DAR = EL+AS  
DS = EL*CS  
EL = SMTH1(O, 4)  
O = 9600 - STEP(600, 4) + STEP(600, 5)  
S_AdjTm = 4  
    
Second_Order_Supply_Node_with_Distribution_and_Delay:  
Btry(t) = Btry(t - dt) + (BtryRecieve - BtryIssue) * dt  
INIT Btry = DBtry  
INFLOWS:  
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BtryRecieve = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
OUTFLOWS:  
BtryIssue = issuedPlts  
Combat_Train(t) = Combat_Train(t - dt) + (OrderRateS4 - BtryRecieve) * dt  
INIT Combat_Train = 9600  
TRANSIT TIME = 1  
CAPACITY = INF  
INFLOW LIMIT = 18000  
INFLOWS:  
OrderRateS4 = Order_delay  
OUTFLOWS:  
BtryRecieve = CONVEYOR OUTFLOW  
ABtry = (DBtry-Btry)/BtryAT  
BtryAT = 1  
BtryOpReach = 3  
DArrival_from_CT = EL+ABtry  
DBtry = EL*BtryOpReach  
EL = SMTH1(issuedPlts, 3)  
issuedPlts = 9600-STEP(600, 5)+STEP(600, 6)  
Order_delay = DELAY(DArrival_from_CT, Order_delay_time)  
Order_delay_time = 1  
{ The model has 75 (75) variables (array expansion in parens).  
In 3 Modules with 0 Sectors.  
Stocks: 15 (15) Flows: 15 (15) Converters: 45 (45)  
Constants: 19 (19) Equations: 41 (41) Graphicals: 0 (0)  
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